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INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2008, Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell vowed
to veto a statewide smoking ban if it preempted Philadelphia's
more stringent ordinance.1 Lawyers certainly understood what
preemption of local authority meant. Many non-lawyers arguably
had a basic understanding of the news story as well, realizing that
in some situations state law overrides local authority. The con-
cept of preemption may be generally accessible to both the legal
and lay communities, but behind this accessibility lies a doctrine
that some scholars claim is in a state of confusion.2
It is within the larger topic of federalism that preemption finds
its home, as a constitutional doctrine that resolves conflicts be-
tween the regulatory power of the federal government and the
states' police powers. 3 To say that a federal law preempts state
law is to say that state law on the same topic is foreclosed alto-
gether. Any state law that addresses the same area, even if it
does not conflict with the federal law, is foreclosed. 4 Preemption is
not always intended, however, and in these cases federal and state
laws coexist in a state of concurrency. 5 In these situations, the
Supremacy Clause nevertheless dictates that state law must give
way to federal regulation if it conflicts with federal law. 6 Other-
wise, a state is free to regulate in the same area as the federal
government. 7 Importantly, conflict is not relevant to preemption,
but it is central to a supremacy, or conflict, analysis.8 The confu-
1. Tom Barnes, Rendell Says He'll Veto Weakened Ban on Smoking, POST-GAZETTE
Now, May 13, 2008, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/08134/881294-178.stm.
2. David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal
Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1153 (1999);
Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768, 807 (1994).
3. Spence & Murray, supra note 2, at 1127.
4. Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 771.
5. Id.
6. Id. Professor Gardbaum posits that the doctrine originates under the Necessary
and Proper Clause, rather than the Supremacy Clause. Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 773,
782.
7. Id.




sion found in case law typically arises when courts intermingle or
conflate these distinct concepts. 9
To a significant extent, the same analysis applies to competing
state and local regulation. States are free to enact legislation that
preempts local action, meaning that no local legislation of any
kind is permitted in the target area. 10 However, states may in-
stead contemplate concurrent activity with local governments, in
which case municipalities may regulate freely as long as their or-
dinances do not conflict with state law." Key to any preemption
and conflict analysis is an understanding of what local powers are
being exercised and what powers, if any, state law usurps. If it is
found that state law is meant to override local authority alto-
gether, preemption exists, and no further analysis is needed. If,
instead, state law contemplates concurrency, the question becomes
one of supremacy, and a court must determine whether the local
ordinance conflicts with the state law by relying on conflict princi-
ples. In this regard, nothing is more important to preemption and
supremacy analyses than statutory interpretation.
1 2
In recent decades, a rash of preemption disputes have arisen in
Pennsylvania. Many cases involve local attempts to regulate ac-
tivity that is otherwise addressed by the Commonwealth's envi-
ronmental laws. Some of these disputes centered on local police
power regulations that were meant to supplement state environ-
mental regulation, 13 while others involved local zoning legisla-
tion.14 The preemption analysis generally remains the same re-
gardless of whether the type of local legislation is companion envi-
ronmental or nuisance legislation, or zoning. The outcomes, how-
ever, vary. This variance occurs because preemption and suprem-
acy questions ask whether state regulation strips municipalities of
powers that they may otherwise exercise. The Commonwealth's
9. Gaurdbaum, supra note 2, at 768, 807.
10. See, e.g., Duff v. Northampton Twp., 532 A.2d 500, 504 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987)
(noting that Pennsylvania municipalities have limited police power over local matters that
does not extend to activities in need of uniform regulation or matters of "general public
interest which necessarily require an exclusive state policy") (emphasis added), aff'd, 550
A.2d 1919 (Pa. 1988).
11. See, e.g., W. Pa. Rest. Ass'n v. City of Pittsburgh, 77 A.2d 616, 620 (Pa. 1951) (set-
ting forth the basic supremacy analysis, which bans local regulation that is inconsistent
with or contradicts state law).
12. Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 770 ("Preemption claims should be resolved through
application of ordinary rules of statutory interpretation .... ").
13. See, e.g., Sunny Farms, Ltd. v. N. Codorus Twp., 474 A.2d 56 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1984).
14. See, e.g., Greene Twp. v. Kuhl, 379 A.2d 1383 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977); Kuhl v.
Commonwealth, 467 A.2d 912 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
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decision to establish an environmental regulatory program, for
example, may preempt all or part of a locality's environmental
authority but leave untouched any local attempts to address very
similar concerns by way of nuisance or zoning regulation. There-
fore, it is legitimate to ask whether the outcome of a preemption or
conflict dispute should hinge on the label affixed to local legisla-
tion. The question becomes even more valid when one acknowl-
edges that those labels are becoming frayed at the edges as the
line between environmental protection and land use planning con-
tinues to blur.15 It is imperative that the preemption and suprem-
acy doctrines remain true to their underpinnings to avoid inde-
terminacy in this age of interest convergence.
This article asks whether Pennsylvania's preemption jurispru-
dence should be adjusted to enable it to better address the chal-
lenges brought upon the Commonwealth and its municipalities by
the growing overlap between environmental and land use con-
cerns. It will focus on preemption cases brought under the Com-
monwealth's Solid Waste Management Act ("SWMIA"), 16 and this
author will ultimately suggest that some revision is in order.
Suggestions include bringing more consistency and clarity to pre-
emption and conflict analyses through careful legislative drafting
and consistent analytical methodology that acknowledge the very
real differences between statewide environmental initiatives and
municipal action intended to preserve and protect local environ-
mental and social values. It is also important to bear in mind en-
vironmental law's encouragement of devolution of authority to
governmental entities that are closest to the problem at hand.
1 7
These suggestions may prevent outcomes that are doctrinally
flawed or inefficient, or that reflect political ideologies that have
no place in these decisions.'
8
15. See, e.g., Lee Paddock, Commentary, Navigating the Confluence Among Real Estate,
Land Use, and Environmental Law, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 677 (2006); Douglas A. Yang-
gen & Leslie L. Amrhein, Groundwater Quality Regulation: Existing Governmental Author-
ity and Recommended Roles, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 53 (1989) ("[Zoning has taken on an
environmental focus through the regulation of 'sensitive' lands ... .
16. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6018.101-6018.1003 (2003).
17. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetric Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1565-67 (2007).
18. See Spence & Murray, supra note 2, at 1130. Although the discussion here is pri-
marily limited to preemption under one of Pennsylvania's environmental laws, it will nev-
ertheless be of value to practitioners in all jurisdictions, since the preemption doctrine is
fundamentally the same in every state, 3 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING & PLANNING §
48:4 (4th ed. 2007-2008), and the intermingling of environmental and land use regulation is
a nationwide trend. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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A necessary starting point for this discussion is a review of the
municipal powers that are typically at issue in these cases. Those
powers include the authority to address nuisances, the more gen-
eral police powers, and zoning authority. The summary below will
make it clear that each of these three seemingly distinct powers is
broad enough to target certain land use and environmental mat-
ters. A discussion of Pennsylvania's most significant preemption
cases will follow, presented in three categories: cases involving
state and local regulation in the same area, cases resolving con-
flicts between local land use regulations and broad state regula-
tory programs that include limited land use powers, and cases
where state environmental regulations are pitted against conflict-
ing municipal land use regulations. A review of pertinent portions
of the SWMA and regulations will then be presented, followed by a
discussion of selected preemption and supremacy decisions under
the Act. The final portions of this article will summarize various
themes and concerns that emerge from these authorities and will
elaborate on the suggestions alluded to earlier.
I. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN PENNSYLVANIA
The objective here is not to present a comprehensive primer on
local government law in the Commonwealth; rather, it is to high-
light the range of powers municipalities may exercise in relation
to solid waste management. In Pennsylvania, those powers de-
pend on the type of municipality involved. Philadelphia, for ex-
ample, is a city of the first class with home rule authority, empow-
ering it to exercise "all powers ... of local self-government and...
complete powers of legislation and administration in relation to its
municipal functions."'19 The city is as free to enact legislation as is
the General Assembly, as long as its ordinances are consistent
with the federal and Pennsylvania constitutions.20 Other munici-
palities in the Commonwealth, which include second and third
class cities, first and second class townships, boroughs, and incor-
porated towns, are governed by their own enabling acts.21 The
19. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13131 (2003).
20. § 13131.
21. Pittsburgh is a second-class city governed by the Second Class City Code, 53 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 22101-30915 (2003). It adopted a home rule charter pursuant to its
enabling legislation in 1974. 302 PA. CODE § 11.8-812; see generally § 11.1-101 - 11.8-813.
The Third Class City Code is found at 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 35101-39701 (2003).
First- and second-class townships are also governed by their own codes, found at 53 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 55101-58047 (2003) and 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 65101-70105
(2003), respectively. The Borough Code appears at 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 45101-
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primary authority for land use for the vast majority of local gov-
ernments is set forth in the Commonwealth's Municipalities Plan-
ning Code ("MPC").
22
Local regulations on solid waste management are typically
grounded in the police power, which was originally held exclu-
sively by the Commonwealth to promote the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens. 23 The General Assembly has since dele-
gated its police power to the Commonwealth's municipalities 24 in
different ways and to varying extents, authorizing them to combat
public nuisances, act in cooperation with the state in relation to
solid waste management, and engage in land use planning.
25 It is
hornbook law that Pennsylvania's municipalities possess only
those powers that have been expressly given to them.26 Enabling
act language thus is crucial, and grants of authority tend to be
narrowly construed.27 Although there is a presumption that local
land use ordinances are valid,28 a municipality must exercise its
powers reasonably.
29
Local authority to address environmental matters and nui-
sances is clearly established. All municipalities in Pennsylvania
have the power to abate nuisances 30 and to ban nuisances per se.
31
48101 (2003), and incorporated towns are governed by 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 53101-
53862.
22. The MPC is embedded in the state's general municipal law provisions and can be
found at 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10101- 11202 (2003). Section 10107 of the MPC de-
fines "municipality" to include cities of the second or third class, first- and second-class
townships, boroughs, incorporated towns, home rule municipalities, and counties of the
second through eighth classes. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10107.
23. Pennsylvania's police power has been described as "fundamental because it enables
'civil' society' to respond in an appropriate and effective fashion to changing political, eco-
nomic, and social circumstances . . . to maintain its vitality and order .... The police
power of a state . . . [is] as comprehensive as the demands of society require under the
circumstances." National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Envtl. Res., 414
A.2d 37, 42 (Pa. 1980) (citation omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.,
371 A.2d 461, 467 (Pa. 1977)).
24. The term "municipality" and "municipalities" will be used in this paper to refer to
all types of local governments that exist in Pennsylvania.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 30-47.
26. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hanzlik, 161 A.2d 340, 343 (Pa. 1960).
27. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ashenfelder, 198 A.2d 514, 516 (Pa. 1964) (holding that
the Second Class Township Code does not delegate vast powers).
28. Moyer's Landfill, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 450 A.2d 273, 277 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1982).
29. See Ashenfelder, 198 A.2d at 516; Moyer's Landfill, 450 A.2d at 276-77.
30. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 14611, 14613 (2003) (First Class Cities); 24562
(2008), 24568 (2003) (Second Class Cities); 37321 (2003), 37324 (2008) (Third Class Cities);
48106 (2003) (Boroughs); 56606 (2003) (First Class Townships); 66529 (2008) (Second Class
Townships).
31. Hanzlik, 161 A.2d at 342-43.
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They are also free to regulate offensive activities that do not cre-
ate a nuisance, 32 a power they have used to regulate solid waste
activities.33 Municipalities are also free to enact local environ-
mental ordinances under their general police powers. 34 More
commonly, local governments choose to enact environmental ordi-
nances when a state environmental statute authorizes them to do
so. The Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduc-
tion Act, for example, specifically authorizes municipalities to
regulate the transportation, collection, and storage of municipal
waste within their boundaries. 35
At times, however, municipalities have sought to regulate solid
waste facilities under neither a nuisance rationale nor an express
delegation of power from the SWVMA. They have instead used their
land use authority.36 That authority is both broad and specific,
and regardless of the type of municipality involved, the opportu-
nity exists to employ land use powers in ways that further envi-
ronmental as well as land use policies.
The land use powers of Pennsylvania's cities of the first and sec-
ond class (Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, respectively) are virtually
identical and appear in their respective enabling acts. The cities
may zone to promote the police powers 37 and are free to restrict
land uses, the size and height of buildings, and the amount of land
that can be occupied by structures. 38 These broad powers exist to
enable the Commonwealth's largest cities to respond to their
unique geography and character. 39 Furthermore, the codes gov-
32. Id.; Hunlock Twp. v. Hunlock Sand & Gravel Corp., 601 A.2d 1305, 1307 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992). Although these powers authorize a municipality to enact a nuisance
ordinance that restricts land use to a limited extent, there may be a fine line between the
exercise of this power and unauthorized attempts at zoning. Id. at 1307 (holding that a
setback requirement in a nuisance ordinance regulating solid waste facilities, enacted by a
township without a zoning ordinance, was not an illegal attempt to zone, stating, "[sletback
requirements may be imposed by other types of regulations in addition to zoning").
33. One township without a zoning ordinance, for example, successfully used its nui-
sance authority to impose a stringent setback requirement on a sludge composting facility.
Hunlock Twp., 601 A.2d at 1305-06.
34. See Longenecker v. Pine Grove Landfill, Inc., 543 A.2d 215, 216 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988) (making note of the township's general police powers but holding that the ordinance
at issue was not a police power regulation but rather an illegal attempt to zone).
35. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4000.304 (2003).
36. See, e.g., Se. Chester County Refuse Auth. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 898 A.2d 680 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2006) [hereinafter SECCRA], appeal denied, 921 A.2d 499 (Pa. 2007).
37. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 14751 (2008) (first class city powers); 53 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 25051 (2008) (second class city powers).
38. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 14751-14752; 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 25051.
39. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 25053 (2008) (directing second class cities to exercise
their zoning powers by considering "the topography and character of the district, with its
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erning first and second class cities each include a conflict-of-laws
provision, which states that city standards will govern in the
event a city land use ordinance imposes stricter requirements
than those imposed by a state statute.
40
All other municipalities in Pennsylvania are governed by the
MPC, 41 the objectives of which are expansive. 42 The aim of the
MPC is not simply to authorize municipalities to determine land
uses, sizes and heights of buildings, open space dimensions, and
other matters relevant to the general welfare, 43 but also to con-
sider a municipality's "character" and "special nature" by zoning
to preserve natural, agricultural, and historic amenities. 44 Al-
though a municipality's zoning restrictions generally must be uni-
form across all of its districts, special classifications are permitted
for "places having a special character or use affecting and affected
by their surroundings."45 The purposes of zoning are as much di-
rected at fighting blight, overcrowding, and traffic congestion as
they are at protecting various environmental amenities, including
wetlands, forests, and floodplains.
46
The land use authority for all of Pennsylvania's municipalities
includes the use of zoning to address their unique character and
topography as well as local environmental concerns. The MPC
goes even further by embracing a broader conception of land use
that references the economic and social parameters of sustainable
development. 47 While the scope of the zoning power under the
MPC is remarkable, the crucial point for the purposes of this dis-
cussion is that the Code unquestionably reflects an understanding
that zoning exists, in large part, to enable municipalities to deal
with unique local features and environmental conditions.
peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving [property values] and
encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such city").
40. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 14762, 25058 (2008). Both of these statutes also provide
that a state statute will prevail if stricter than the city ordinance. Id.
41. The MPC's definition of "municipality" includes all local governmental entities
except first and second class cities. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10107 (2008) (including
second class A and third class cities, boroughs, incorporated towns, and all classes of town-
ship, among other entities).
42. Section 10105 of the MPC includes the usual goals of promoting health, safety, and
morals. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10105 (2008).
43. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10603(a) (2008).
44. Id. at (a)-(b) (noting that these powers exist unless preempted by a list of specific
environmental laws, not including the SWMA).
45. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10605(l)-(2).
46. See, e.g., §§ 10105, 10605. Section 10105 further links the general welfare prong of
the police powers to "economic, practical, and social and cultural facilities .... ".
47. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10105 (including the protection and promotion of eco-
nomic, social, and cultural facilities and growth among the purposes of land use planning).
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A number of well-settled legal principles and rules of construc-
tion are ubiquitous in zoning cases. A zoning ordinance's validity
depends on compliance with the procedural requirements of the
MPC. 48 Furthermore, a zoning ordinance will be found substan-
tively invalid if it is arbitrary, unnecessary, or unreasonable, or if
it is enacted solely to restrict future development, even if it is in-
tended to promote the police powers. 49 Finally, although courts
construe a municipality's zoning power liberally, they will inter-
pret zoning ordinances narrowly because they are in derogation of
the common law.
50
Pennsylvania's municipal land use powers are heavily codified
and well developed by case law. These powers are often the sub-
ject of preemption cases, where their strength and distinctiveness
can play a pivotal role in resolving competing state and local au-
thority.
II. PENNSYLVANIA'S PREEMPTION AND SUPREMACY LAW
The following cases are representative of Pennsylvania's pre-
emption case law.51 Some of these cases do not deal with conflicts
between state environmental laws and local land use ordinances;
nevertheless, they are cited in preemption cases of all kinds. To-
gether, they affirm the importance of a multi-step analysis in
these disputes and reveal a degree of confusion about the distinc-
tion between preemption and conflict.
To recap, in cases of state preemption, a locality has no power to
regulate in the area; in the case of concurrency, however, a locality
may regulate as long as its regulation is consistent with state
law.52 It is notable that Pennsylvania has found total preemption
in only three areas: liquor control,53 anthracite strip mining, 54 and
48. Longenecker, 543 A.2d at 216-17 (invalidating a local ordinance mandating landfill
setbacks due to noncompliance with the MPC).
49. Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 228 A.2d 169, 178 (Pa. 1967)
(holding a local ban on quarries unconstitutional).
50. Exton Quarries, 228 A.2d at 173-74. This rule is echoed in the MPC, which pro-
vides that, in case of doubt about the meaning of a zoning ordinance, it should be inter-
preted in a property owner's favor. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10603.1 (2003).
51. Throughout this article, the phrases "preemption case law" and "preemption cases"
will be used to refer to cases dealing with preemption as well as those dealing with conflict
under supremacy principles.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 4-7; see also 3 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING
AND PLANNING § 48:4 (4th ed. 2007-2008).
53. Petition of Hilovsky, 108 A.2d 705 (Pa. 1954).
54. Harris-Walsh, Inc. v. Borough of Dickson City, 216 A.2d 329 (Pa. 1966).
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banking.55 The meager number of cases in which total preemption
has been found underscores the harshness of the doctrine and the
rarity of its existence. 56
These core cases might be presented based on the type of pre-
emption involved: express preemption, where statutory language
clearly states local action is forbidden; 57 field preemption, where
the legislature intends for the state to occupy the field;58 or con-
flict/supremacy cases, where local law conflicts with state law.
59
This article will instead categorize these cases by distinguishing
between those that deal with state and local laws that attempt to
regulate in the same area, those where state and local agencies
with overlapping yet distinct land use powers attempt to regulate
the same activity, and those where state regulation in an area un-
related to land use conflicts with a local land use regulation. In
this latter category, the disputes often involve state environ-
mental regulations that conflict with local land use ordihances.60
These categories will be referred to as "companion regulation
cases," "overlapping land use authority cases," and "environ-
mental-land use disputes," respectively.
55. City of Pittsburgh v. Allegheny Valley Bank, 412 A.2d 1366 (Pa. 1980) (superceded
by statute as recognized in City of Phila. v. Clement & Muller, Inc., 715 A.2d 397 (Pa.
1998)).
56. See Hydropress Envtl. Serv., Inc. v. Twp. of Upper Mt. Bethel, 836 A.2d 912, 918
(Pa. 2003) (plurality opinion) (referring to the harshness of the preemption doctrine).
57. Spence & Murray, supra note 2, at 1134.
58. Id.
59. Id. For example, in the three cases referred to above where preemption was found
to exist, the courts were convinced of the General Assembly's intent to occupy the field.
Hilovsky, 108 A.2d at 707; Harris-Walsh, 216 A.2d at 336; Allegheny Valley Bank, 412 A.2d
at 1369. Some courts have characterized Allegheny Valley Bank as one that found preemp-
tion based on commercial necessity. See, e.g., Council of Middletown Twp. v. Benham, 523
A.2d 311, 314 (Pa. 1987). However, a review of the case makes clear that it, too, was based
on field preemption. See Allegheny Valley Bank, 412 A.2d at 1369.
60. See, e.g., Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Twp., 451 A.2d 1002 (Pa. 1982)
(Court called upon to determine whether the Surface Mining Conservation and Reclama-
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Of these three types of cases, the environmental-land use dis-
pute is unique in that the Commonwealth's and municipality's
respective powers do not overtly overlap (or at least have not been
traditionally understood to coincide with one another). Further-
more, when overlap does occur, it is not as patent or as broad as in
other types of preemption disputes, and the overlap arguably is
not as threatening to statewide regulation as might be the case in
a companion regulation case or in an overlapping land use author-
ity case. In this third category, the powers being exercised by the
state and local government promote two different things: envi-
ronmental protection and responsible land use planning, respec-
tively. Absent express or field preemption, these cases should eas-
ily be resolved under a supremacy analysis. Logic suggests that,
because environmental regulation and land use regulation serve
different objectives, no conflict would exist, leaving local regula-
tion intact. Although this observation is generally accurate, the
cases are not consistently analyzed in this manner. The preemp-
tion analysis at times fails to distinguish between the general ob-
jectives of land use and environmental regulation and instead fo-
cuses narrowly on the specific provisions of competing state and
local laws.
A. Companion Regulation Cases
The seminal case of Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Associa-
tion v. City of Pittsburgh6' involved a dispute over allegedly con-
61. 77 A.2d 616 (Pa. 1951).
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flicting provisions of a state law and a Pittsburgh ordinance, both
of which regulated restaurants. 62 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court found no preemption, partially because the state law ex-
pressly authorized consistent, supplemental local legislation.63 In
upholding portions of the city ordinance and invalidating others,
64
the Court recited rules of preemption and conflict in language that
has been quoted in numerous subsequent decisions:
It is of course self-evident that a municipal ordinance cannot be
sustained to the extent that it is contradictory to, or inconsistent
with, a state statute. But, generally speaking "it has long been
the established general rule, in determining whether a conflict
exists between a general and local law, that where the legislature
has assumed to regulate a given course of conduct by prohibitory
enactments, a municipal corporation with subordinate power to
act in the matter may make such additional regulations in aid and
furtherance of the purpose of the general law as may seem appro-
priate to the necessities of the particular locality and which are
not in themselves unreasonable." National Milk Producers Asso-
ciation v. City & County of San Francisco, 20 Cal.2d 101, 109, 124
P.2d 25, 29. Thus it has been held in our own Commonwealth
that municipalities in the exercise of the police power may regu-
late certain occupations by imposing restrictions which are in ad-
dition to, and not in conflict with, statutory regulations. But if the
general tenor of the statute indicates an intention on the part of
the legislature that it should not be supplemented by municipal
bodies, that intention must be given effect and the attempted local
legislation held invalid.65
This language can be analyzed in reference to the preemp-
tion/supremacy distinction. The Court does not address preemp-
tion first. Instead, it begins by stating the basic supremacy rule:
a municipal ordinance cannot be "contradictory to, or inconsistent
with, a state statute."66 The Court then provides a rule to help
resolve conflicts between state and local legislation in the same
area: municipalities may enact companion or supplemental regu-
lations "in aid and furtherance of' a state statute "as may seem
appropriate to the necessities of the particular locality and which
62. W. Pa. Rest. Ass'n, 77 A.2d 616.
63. Id. at 620.
64. Id. at 621.




are not in themselves unreasonable."67 Only then does the Court
mention the possibility of total preemption, noting that if the
"general tenor" of a state law reveals an intent "that it should not
be supplemented by municipal bodies," then local legislation is
prohibited. 68 This final statement reflects the field preemption
doctrine, under which a locality would not be free to legislate at
all. The Court's distinction between total preemption and concur-
rency is both correct and important.
The language could have been more clear. The Court never
mentioned preemption by express statutory language, most likely
because the state law did not expressly preempt local law. The
Court might also have clarified that the supremacy rule applies
when there is no express or field preemption. Nevertheless, its
analysis reflects a basic analytical progression, first rejecting pre-
emption and then turning to supremacy and conflict.69 In addition
to providing a rule generally fixing the reach of local regulation in
the case of concurrency, the Court emphasized the importance of
statutory language in any preemption case.
70
To the extent that any ambiguity remained after Western Penn-
sylvania Restaurant Association, it was resolved forty-eight years
later in Mars Emergency Medical Services, Inc. v. Township of Ad-
ams.71 That case resolved a conflict between Pennsylvania's
Emergency Medical Services ("EMS") Act and two local ordinances
designating local EMS providers. 72 The Court cited the rules from
Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Association and emphasized the
rarity of preemption. 73 Unlike the statute at issue in Western
Pennsylvania Restaurant Association, however, the EMS Act was
silent as to local authority to legislate in the area. 74 Accordingly,
the Court scrutinized the statutory language for restrictions on
local legislation.75 Finding none, it proceeded to consider whether
the municipalities involved-a second class township and a bor-
ough-had the authority to designate EMS providers. 76 After re-
viewing the relevant enabling legislation, the Court concluded
67. W. Pa. Rest. Ass'n, 77 A.2d at 620 (citations omitted).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 620-21.
70. Id. at 619-20.
71. 740 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1999).
72. Mars, 740 A.2d at 193.
73. Id. at 195-96 (noting the three instances where total preemption exists).





that both municipalities acted within their authority.7 7 The case
was thus reduced to a supremacy issue and, in determining
whether the local ordinances were consistent with the state law,
the Court stated that it was necessary to consider "whether the
[local ordinances] advanced or thwarted the purposes of the act."78
The case was remanded for the trial court to make that determi-
nation.
79
Mars is notable for the progression of its analysis. The Court
dealt with possible preemption first and, finding no express or im-
plied preemption, proceeded to the issue of municipal authority.
Having determined that the necessary authority existed, it then
addressed the supremacy issue. The opinion also elaborated on
considerations that are relevant to a conflict or consistency analy-
sis, directing the lower court to determine whether the local ordi-
nances further the purposes of the state law. Thus, a local law,
even if enacted with authority, will be held to be inconsistent with
a state law-and therefore overridden-if it thwarts the state
law's objectives. Mars not only filled the gap left by Western
Pennsylvania Restaurant Association by inquiring into both ex-
press and implied preemption, but it elaborated on relevant su-
premacy considerations.
In 2003, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had the opportunity
to hear a companion regulation case involving a state environ-
mental statute. In Hydropress Environmental Services, Inc. v.
Township of Upper Mt. Bethel, the Court considered whether a
local ordinance regulating the application of biosolids to agricul-
tural lands was preempted by the SWMA.8 0 This case will be de-
scribed more fully below, but a few points should be mentioned
here. Although Hydropress was a plurality decision on the matter
of preemption,81 it reaffirmed the doctrine set forth in Western
Pennsylvania Restaurant Association.8 2 The justices in Hydro-
press who believed the SWMIA did not preempt local legislation
stated that, because of the harshness of preemption, the intent to
77. Mars, 740 A.2d at 196.
78. Id. at 196-97 (noting that the objectives of the EMS Act included the provision of
"effective and efficient emergency medical services on a uniform basis throughout the
Commonwealth").
79. Id. at 197.
80. 836 A.2d 912 (Pa. 2003) (plurality opinion).
81. Hydropress, 836 A.2d at 920. Three justices found that the SWMA did not preempt
local legislation; three others disagreed. Id. at 918-19.
82. Id. at 918.
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preempt must be clearly expressed or otherwise certain.8 3 They
relied heavily on statutory language contemplating state and local
cooperation and power sharing in the area of solid waste man-
agement. 84 Their rationale echoed a factor that was also relevant
in Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Association: in cases where
there is no express preemption, courts will be less likely to find
implied preemption if the state legislation creates a partnership
between state and local authorities in the regulated area.
A final companion regulation case is Duff v. Northampton
Township,8 5 which preceded both Mars and Hydropress. The
Commonwealth Court was called upon to determine whether a
local firearms ordinance conflicted with a Pennsylvania statute
that restricted hunting with firearms within a certain distance of
a dwelling.8 6 The court addressed whether the ordinance was pre-
empted by the game law, or in the alternative, whether it was
unlawful as an unreasonable exercise of the municipality's police
powers.8 7 In doing so, and in ultimately invalidating the ordi-
nance,88 the court unfortunately intermingled the preemption and
supremacy concepts, thereby creating an unclear decisional
framework that has reappeared in subsequent decisions.
Several times throughout the opinion, Senior Judge Narick in-
terchangeably referred to preemption and supremacy without
clearly delineating the two. The court claimed that the ordinance
conflicted with the state law, yet at the same time maintained
that the game law reflected a need for uniform statewide regula-
tion.8 9 However, as noted earlier, a conflict requires a supremacy
analysis, whereas an intent to create a statewide regulatory pro-
gram invokes field preemption. If preemption is found, local legis-
lation is forbidden, even if it does not conflict with the state
scheme; therefore, a supremacy analysis is irrelevant. Later in
Duff, the court correctly noted that express or implied preemption
strips a municipality of its power to regulate 90 but then immedi-
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 532 A.2d 500 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987), affd, 550 A.2d 1319 (Pa. 1988).
86. Duff, 532 A.2d at 500-02. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court looked at a similar
case earlier, but avoided the preemption issue. See Ashenfelder, 198 A.2d at 514. The
ordinance in Duff was both broader and more restrictive than the state law. One provision,
not found in the state law, required hunters to get approval from the police chief before
hunting in township safety zones. Duff, 532 A.2d at 502.
87. Duff, 532 A.2d at 501.
88. Id. at 505-06.
89. Id. at 503.
90. Id. at 503-04.
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ately cited the portion of Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Asso-
ciation that addressed conflict in cases of concurrent regulation. 91
The court then promptly reverted to the preemption rule, stating
that "a municipality may be foreclosed from exercising power it
would otherwise have if the state has sufficiently acted in a par-
ticular field."
92
The back-and-forth references to preemption and conflict culmi-
nated in a presentation of five questions that the court stated were
pertinent in finding preemption:
(1) Does the ordinance conflict with the state law, either be-
cause of conflicting policies or operational effect, that is, does
the ordinance forbid what the legislature has permitted? (2)
Was the state law intended expressly or impliedly to be exclu-
sive in the field? (3) Does the subject matter reflect a need for
uniformity? (4) Is the state scheme so pervasive or compre-
hensive that it precludes coexistence of municipal regulation?
(5) Does the ordinance stand as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
the legislature?
93
Like other portions of the opinion, these questions mingled fac-
tors relevant to both preemption and supremacy without setting
them within an analytical progression. Questions 2, 3, and 4 ad-
dress field preemption, while questions 1 and 5 concern suprem-
acy and conflict in cases of concurrency. Unfortunately, the court
never made that distinction and presented all five questions as
relevant to "preemption" alone. Duff is not unique. It reflects a
lack of clarity common in preemption case law.94 Ironically, be-
cause the court eventually held that the state's game law pre-
empted the field of firearm regulation, 95 supremacy was not an
issue, and two of the five questions need not have been presented.
To be sure, Duff correctly stresses the importance of statutory
construction,96 and it is helpful in noting that no presumption of
preemption arises merely because the General Assembly passes a
91. Id. at 504.
92. Duff, 532 A.2d at 504.
93. Id. at 505.
94. See supra text accompanying note 2.
95. Duff, 532 A.2d at 506.
96. Id. at 504.
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law. 97 Nevertheless, the case's five questions are an unfortunate
legacy that has tainted later decisions.
B. Overlapping Land Use Authority Cases
A second series of cases deals with conflicts between local land
use ordinances and state land use powers that are embedded
within larger regulatory programs. Because these cases are ones
of limited overlap in land use authority, they could properly be
labeled companion regulation cases. Indeed, the basic preemption
analysis remains the same. However, these cases are treated
separately because of the special deference given to municipal
land use authority. As will soon be shown, local land use powers
are treated specially when compared to the police powers exer-
cised in the companion dispute cases addressed above.
School District of Philadelphia v. Zoning Board of Adjustment
illustrates this deferential treatment.98 In the 1960's, the Phila-
delphia School District, which operated under the Public School
Code, proposed a plan for a new school building and parking lot
that would violate the height and rear-yard limits of the city's zon-
ing ordinance as well as off-street parking restrictions. 99 When
the school district was denied a building permit, it sued unsuc-
cessfully, despite its argument that it was "exempt" from the city's
zoning ordinance. 100 The district relied in part, on statutory lan-
guage that obligated it to provide schools and grounds as needed
to administer a statewide program of public education and which
gave it discretionary authority over both the location and size of
schools. 101
In School District of Philadelphia, much of the Court's preemp-
tion and conflict analysis was familiar. The sequence of analytical
steps, however, differed, and special attention was given to the
city's land use authority. Rather than beginning with a discussion
of preemption and supremacy rules, the Court addressed the scope
of the city's zoning powers.10 2 It explained that Philadelphia had
extensive powers of self-government, virtually enabling it to legis-
97. Id. at 503.
98. 207 A.2d 864 (Pa. 1965).
99. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 207 A.2d at 865-66. The case was ultimately brought as a chal-
lenge solely against the off-street parking provisions. Id. at 866.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 868.
102. Id. at 867.
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late as would the General Assembly. 10 3 Nevertheless, the city
could not act in a manner "contrary to, or in limitation or
enlargement of, powers granted by acts of the General Assembly"
that related to the regulation of public schools. 10 4 The Court de-
termined that the zoning restrictions at issue did not deal with the
regulation of public schools, which focuses on the quality of public
education rather than the buildings in which that education is
provided. 105
In essence, by carefully considering the objectives of zoning and
finding those objectives different from the aims of the Public
School Code, the Court rejected the district's supremacy argu-
ment. The Court characterized zoning as "peculiarly a local mat-
ter," while the Code dealt with matters of "state-wide concern." 10
6
Not only did the Court find no conflict because the off-street park-
ing restrictions did not interfere with the Public School Code, but
it also held that the Code did not give the school district "plenary
power over its physical plants. ' 10 7 Thus, the Court found no pre-
emption of local land use authority and no conflict, based on the
nature of the powers at play.108 Philadelphia was free to impose
more stringent restrictions on schools to address "congestion and
other peculiarly local problems [.]"109
A similar case arose on the other side of the Commonwealth a
few years later. In City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, the
Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections sought to lease city land for a
women's prison pre-release center without seeking zoning ap-
103. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 207 A.2d at 867 (referring to the First Class City Home Rule
Act).
104. Id. (citing then 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13101 (2008)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 868.
107. Id. at 868-70.
108. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 207 A.2d at 868. The Court so held despite the language in the
Public School Code that arguably gave the District authority over the location of schools.
Id.
109. Id. at 870. The Court also relied on the conflict-of-laws provision in the First Class
City Home Rule Act, and other state laws dealing with municipal buildings, including
schools, that specifically call for the acquisition of municipal building permits when re-
quired by local ordinance. Id. at 869. Four years later, the Court addressed head on
whether a first-class township, acting under the authority of its zoning ordinance, could
restrict the location of schools. Appeal of Radnor Twp. Sch. Auth., 252 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1969).
The case was treated as a conflict between two state statutes; thus, it was not cast as a
preemption case. Instead, the Court resorted to the state's Statutory Construction Act to
determine whether the statutes could coexist, and ultimately held that the Public School




proval. 110 The Bureau relied on the land use powers included in
its expansive enabling legislation that gave it the power to estab-
lish the location of pre-release centers throughout the state as it
felt they were needed."1 The Court found no legislative grant of
site selection powers to the Bureau, nor any other language imply-
ing that the Bureau was not bound by local zoning powers.11 2 The
case was thus one of conflict, and the Court ultimately held that
the Bureau was not "immune" from Pittsburgh's zoning ordi-
nance.
113
The conflict analysis in City of Pittsburgh included a number of
new observations. Because the Bureau and the city were both
state entities with legislative power, the Court considered them
equal agents exercising state-given powers.114 As such, the state
agency would not automatically prevail over the city.1 15 The Court
noted that, although the two entities could exercise only those
powers given to them by the General Assembly, local zoning pow-
ers are often more comprehensive than those given to state agen-
cies.116 More importantly, the Court acknowledged the need to
examine legislative intent in resolving the conflict between the
Bureau's and the city's land use authority, crafting a balancing
test that looked to the nature and purpose of each entity's legisla-
tive grant of power and the circumstances of the case.11 7 In ruling
for the city, the Court focused on the city's powers to engage in
comprehensive planning, the conflict-of-laws provision in the Sec-
ond Class City Code, and the fact that the Bureau was not given
the power of eminent domain.118
Less than ten years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court par-
tially overruled City of Pittsburgh in Commonwealth Department
of General Services v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Association.119
Ogontz was another overlapping land use authority dispute in
which a state agency was denied a local land use permit-this
110. City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 360 A.2d 607, 609 (Pa. 1976), overruled by,
Commw. Dep't of Gen. Serv. v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass'n, 483 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1984), and
superseded by statute, Act of July 13, 1987, 1987 Pa. Legis. Serv. 102, as stated in, Dela-
ware County Solid Waste Auth. v. Earl Twp., 535 A.2d 225 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
111. City of Pittsburgh, 360 A.2d at 612.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 609, 614.
114. Id. at 610.
115. Id.
116. City of Pittsburgh, 360 A.2d at 611.
117. Id. at 611-12.
118. Id. at 613.
119. 483 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1984).
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time, for a daycare center for mentally handicapped individuals in
Philadelphia. 120 As in School District of Philadelphia, the Court
first examined the city's powers, focusing on Philadelphia's home
rule authority and the conflict-of-laws provision. 121 By statute, the
Department of Public Welfare could use eminent domain to fur-
ther its program to integrate patients from a hospital and school
into the community. 122 The Court recognized the case as one of
conflict between a state agency's land use powers and a municipal-
ity's zoning ordinance, echoing City of Pittsburgh's characteriza-
tion of the case as one involving two equally positioned govern-
mental authorities. 123
After emphasizing the equal footing of the Department and the
city, the Court engaged in statutory interpretation to determine
whether either entity had "preeminent powers. 1 24 Underscoring
that the "common thread" in this type of case is the need to ascer-
tain legislative intent, 125 the Court rejected City of Pittsburgh's
balancing test as both uncertain and irrelevant to legislative in-
tent. 26 The Court then turned to Pennsylvania's Statutory Con-
struction Act, particularly that section which directs courts to con-
sider "the consequences of a particular interpretation" when ad-
dressing conflicting state laws. 127 The Court rationalized that the
city's zoning policies would be frustrated if the Department pre-
vailed; if the city prevailed, however, the Department would
merely need to find another location. 28 A decision in the city's
120. Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 449-50.
121. Id. at 451-52. Again, the conflict of laws provision provides that, in cases where
Philadelphia's zoning ordinance is more stringent than those of any other state or local
ordinance, the city's more stringent provisions will prevail. Id. at 451.
122. Id. at 452.
123. Id.
124. Id. The conflict-of-laws provision applicable to cities of the first class did not re-
solve the dispute, because it does not apply to land use restrictions. Id. at 452-53 (noting
the provision instead applies to "setback, height, and similar restrictions").
125. Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 453-54.
126. Id. at 454. The City of Pittsburgh balancing test had been expanded to include six
factors relevant to a conflict analysis. Id. at 452-53. The Court noted that Twp. of South
Fayette v. Commonwealth, 385 A.2d 344, 347 (Pa. 1978), included these factors in the con-
flict balancing test: whether the intended use violates the zoning ordinance; the signifi-
cance of the state's ownership in the property; "the parens patriae responsibility of the
Commonwealth;" the authority in the statute to establish state agency facilities; the ab-
sence of a conflict of laws provision in the enabling legislation; and the particular circum-
stances of the case. Id. at 453. The Court was particularly skeptical of the factor focusing
on eminent domain power. Id. at 454.




favor would uphold both statutes, which the Court wrote, "seems
advisable."
129
Immediately after it held that the Department was subject to
the local zoning ordinance, the Court stated, "We decline to infer a
legislative intent that the Commonwealth agency has preemptive
land use powers.' 130 This reference to preemption is unfortunate.
Ogontz is a case of supremacy and conflict, not preemption. The
Court should have-after addressing the powers of the respective
parties- briefly established that the Department's enabling legis-
lation neither expressly nor impliedly preempted local land use
authority. That conclusion would have placed the conflict analysis
where it belongs-after a determination that preemption does not
exist.
The uncertainty surrounding preemption and conflict in these
three cases should not overshadow their contributions to this dis-
cussion. Unlike the companion regulation cases, the overlapping
land use cases deal with similar powers being exercised by state
and municipal authorities in different contexts. State agencies
with broad programmatic authority that are given some degree of
land use authority must exercise that authority in furtherance of
the overall objectives of their programs. This restriction applied
to the agencies involved in the cases noted previously. In a con-
flict analysis, the exercise of the state agency's land use power will
likely succumb to local land use authority, assuming that there is
no preemption of local land use authority. The outcome is de-
pendent on the type of municipality involved, but municipalities
generally prevail either because 1) the agency's authority is tied to
state policies that are distinct from those underlying land use
power (as in School District of Philadelphia) or 2) state law does
not precisely give an agency site selection or other land use powers
(as in City of Pittsburgh). The comprehensiveness of local zoning
power and the recognition that municipal land use powers serve
peculiarly local concerns are prominent factors in these cases.
Interestingly, in both School District of Philadelphia and Ogontz,
the Court addressed local powers before proceeding to the preemp-
tion and conflict discussion.
129. Id.
130. Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455.
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C. Environmental-Land Use Disputes
A third type of preemption case involves conflicts between
Pennsylvania's environmental laws and local land use ordinances.
Absent express or implied preemption, and based on cases such as
City of Pittsburgh, there would seem to be few supremacy suc-
cesses for the state because the power it exercises under these
laws is distinguishable from municipal zoning power. Even
though local land use authority touches on environmental con-
cerns, it does so only as to local conditions. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court had the opportunity to make that distinction in two
cases but failed to do so.
In Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township,1' 1 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court avoided a conflict analysis alto-
gether. Instead, it focused on whether regulations under the Sur-
face Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA"), which
established setbacks for quarries, 132 preempted preexisting local
zoning setbacks, and if not, whether the local setbacks were arbi-
trary and capricious and hence unreasonable. 33 The relevant por-
tion of SMCRA expressly provided, "[e]xcept with respect to Zon-
ing Ordinances, all local ordinances and enactments purporting to
regulate surface mining are hereby superseded. The Common-
wealth by this enactment hereby preempts the regulation of sur-
face mining operations as herein defined."'134 Reasoning that "su-
perseded" meant replacing something that is already in existence,
the Court held that the local setbacks, although preexisting, were
not affected because of the zoning ordinance exception in the first
clause of the statutory provision. 135 Moreover, "preempt" refers to
the preclusion of something that would otherwise come into effect
in the future, and again, because the local setbacks predated
SMCRA, they were not preempted under the provision's second
clause.136
Having dispensed with preemption, the Court turned to the rea-
sonableness of the township's zoning ordinance. 37 It determined
131. 451 A.2d 1002 (Pa. 1982).
132. Miller & Son Paving, 451 A.2d at 1004 (referencing 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1396.4b (2008) and 25 PA. CODE § 77.102(f)(6) (1998)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1005 (citing section 17 of SMCRA).
135. Id. The Court also relied on provisions of the state's Statutory Construction Act
that call for interpretation of statutes by relying on the common usage of terms and giving
effect to all of a statute's provisions. Id.
136. Id. at 1005.
137. Miller & Son Paving, 451 A.2d at 1006.
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that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proving that
the zoning ordinance failed to promote the public health, safety, or
welfare, 38 and thus never addressed whether the ordinance con-
flicted with the SMCRA setback. 139 Miller Paving is nevertheless
important for distinguishing between statutory supersession and
preemption. The case suggests that, when choosing to override
local authority, the General Assembly should take care to include
both terms-"supersede" and "preempt"-where it intends to
usurp future legislative activity by municipalities as well as legis-
lation that antedates state law.
In Council of Middletown Township v. Benham,140 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court dealt with a similar issue, this time suggest-
ing that a state environmental regulation may override a local
zoning ordinance in certain instances. The case involved a conflict
between Pennsylvania's Sewage Facilities Act and a township zon-
ing ordinance that required residential developments to be ser-
viced by "public sanitary sewer systems."'14 A developer who had
no access to a public system submitted a planned residential de-
velopment application to the township that included private sew-
age treatment. 42 Relying on the public service mandate of the
ordinance, the township denied the application. 143 The Court held
that the Sewage Facilities Act did not preempt local legislation,
primarily because the Act made municipal legislation "an essen-
tial component of the statewide regulatory scheme."' 44 The Act
did, however, expressly provide that any local regulations enacted
in furtherance of local permitting, inspection, and enforcement




139. Id. It is likely the DEP did not raise this issue. If so, one can only wonder why the
DEP failed to make the argument. Had the DEP been able to demonstrate a conflict be-
tween the state and local setbacks, the state law and regulations would prevail. Perhaps
the DEP saw no inherent conflict between environmental regulation and land use regula-
tion.
140. 523 A.2d 311 (Pa. 1987).
141. Benham, 523 A.2d at 311-12.
142. Id. at 312-13. Municipal service would not be extended to the area for at least 20
years. Id. at 313.
143. Id. at 313.
144. Id. at 314. The Court also took the time to carefully review the three cases in which
total preemption was found: Hilovsky, 108 A.2d 705 (Pa. 1954) (liquor), Harris-Walsh, 216
A.2d 329 (Pa. 1966) (anthracite strip mining), and Allegheny Valley Bank, 412 A.2d 1366
(Pa. 1980) (banking). The point was to demonstrate that "[tiotal preemption is the excep-
tion and not the rule." Benham, 523 A.2d at 314-15.
145. Benham, 523 A.2d at 313-14 (citing 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 750.8 (2003)).
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Because the Sewage Facilities Act did not expressly preempt lo-
cal land use authority, and because the Act's power-sharing provi-
sions militated against a finding of implied preemption, the Court
was left to address the supremacy issue. 146 In doing so, it noted
that in a regime of concurrent state and local regulation, local leg-
islation would be overridden only if it "directly and inherently"
conflicted with state law. 147 Furthermore, although courts consis-
tently defer to local zoning authority, giving it "great play,"1 48 the
Sewage Facilities Act expressly forbids municipalities from enact-
ing "inconsistent" ordinances. 49 With this statement, it appeared
that the Court read the consistency provision of the Act to apply to
all local regulation, including land use and companion regulation
alike. Beyond giving deference to local zoning authority, the
Court never considered whether a land use ordinance might ad-
dress matters distinct from those at the heart of the Sewage Fa-
cilities Act. Regardless, the Court determined that, under a broad
interpretation of "public sanitary sewer system," the ordinance
was consistent with the Act.150
The Benham Court worked hard to interpret the zoning ordi-
nance in a way that would allow it to coexist with the Sewage Fa-
cilities Act. Yet, the case implied that when courts are dealing
with possible conflicts between state environmental regulations
and local zoning ordinances, the specific provisions of each law-
rather than the laws' overarching objectives-are the primary fo-
cus. Although the Court did not discuss, in general terms,
whether the goals of zoning conflict with the Commonwealth's en-
vironmental policies, its acknowledgment that courts give "great
play" to zoning ordinances and typically interpret them to pre-
serve their validity adds to the mix of principles used in these
types of disputes.
The Commonwealth Court has more readily embraced the dis-
tinction between environmental regulation and land use regula-
tion, albeit with mixed results. In two cases, the court expressly
146. Id. at 315.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (referring to 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 750.8(b)(9) (2003)).
150. Benham, 523 A.2d at 315-18. The phrase "public sanitary sewer system" was not
specifically defined in the ordinance. Id. at 315. The Court freely applied the principles of
the Statutory Construction Act, despite the fact that, by its own terms, the Act does not
apply to ordinances. Id. Three of the interpretive rules the Court applied were the applica-
tion of plain meaning to undefined statutory terms, the strict construction of zoning ordi-
nances "because they are in derogation of common law and restrict the use of land," and the
interpretation of zoning ordinances sensibly "to preserve their validity." Id. at 315-17.
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focused on the difference between environmental and land use
objectives to allow zoning restrictions and environmental regula-
tory programs to coexist. In Warner Co. v. Zoning Hearing Board,
the court upheld the setback and special exception portions of a
zoning ordinance that applied to a quarry, despite the quarry
owner's argument that they were preempted by the Noncoal Sur-
face Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act. 151 Based on ex-
press language in the Act that preempted all regulation of surface
mining, 152 the court, in an opinion authored by President Judge
Craig, invalidated those portions of the ordinance that regulated
surface mining operations but upheld the setback and special ex-
ception provisions as "traditional land use regulations" that were
neither preempted nor unreasonable. 153 Later in the same year,
the court rejected a preemption challenge under the state Flood
Plain Management Act in Appeal of Hoover.154 The focus in that
case was a township zoning ordinance that imposed numerous
floodplain conservation controls, including one that restricted land
uses in floodplains. 155 Judge Smith, writing for the court, held
that the Act neither preempted local legislation nor conflicted with
the ordinance, reasoning that the ordinance regulated land use,
rather than the structural components of public utility service fa-
cilities, which were the focus of the Act.
156
In 2006, the Commonwealth Court arrived at a different conclu-
sion in deciding a preemption and conflict challenge under the Nu-
trient Management Act ("NMA"). In Burkholder v. Zoning Hear-
ing Board,'57 a landowner once again targeted a zoning setback
that was more stringent than the NMA standard. 158 The NMA
includes a confusing preemption provision that states its provi-
sions "are of Statewide concern and occupy the whole field of regu-
lation . . . to the exclusion of all local regulations."'' 59 It further
provides, however, that no local ordinance may regulate the "stor-
age, handling or land application of animal manure . . . or ... the
construction, location or operation of facilities used for storage of
151. Warner Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 612 A.2d 578 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992), appeal
denied, 624 A.2d 112 (Pa. 1993).
152. Warner Co., 612 A.2d at 580-81 (relying on Miller & Son Paving to analyze the
statute's language).
153. Id. at 582, 584-85.
154. 608 A.2d 607 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
155. Hoover, 608 A.2d at 608.
156. Id. at 609.
157. 902 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).
158. Burkholder, 902 A.2d at 1010.
159. Id. at 1013 (quoting 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717 (2008)).
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animal manure . . . if the municipal ordinance or regulation is in
conflict" with the NMA or its regulations. 160 This language mis-
takenly suggests that preemption and supremacy are one and the
same and reflects the common misunderstanding of the two con-
cepts. If the intent is to preempt local legislation, then no local
laws are allowed, regardless of whether they conflict with the
state law. The holding in Burkholder echoed the statute's confu-
sion: "In light of... the express language of [the NMA's] preemp-
tion provision, . . . it is clear the General Assembly intended to
preempt local regulation of manure storage facilities which con-
flicts with and is more stringent than the NMA and its regula-
tions."161
The court focused on the preemption provision language refer-
ring to the "location" of facilities and held that the zoning setbacks
that applied to any of the landowner's structures governed by the
Act were both in conflict with and more stringent than the NIVA
regulatory setbacks, and they were accordingly "preempted."'162
Burkholder did expressly what Benham implied was possible. It
invalidated a local land use ordinance that conflicted with a state
environmental regulation by examining specific provisions of each
law without investigating their arguably different objectives.
Judge Friedman's dissenting opinion did not disagree with the
majority's approach; rather, it argued that the NMA's setback
provisions merely set minimum location standards and that the
more stringent zoning setbacks were therefore consistent with the
regulations.163
The preemption/conflict confusion in Burkholder is not entirely
benign. Regarding the majority opinion, one could argue that a
misunderstanding or conflation of the two concepts is harmless
because the local setback was invalidated. Whether it failed be-
cause of preemption or conflict is immaterial. Still, if the court
had chosen to consider whether the NMA did, in fact, preempt the
field, its analysis may have been more efficient, because a holding
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1015. The court did not attempt to clarify the preemption provision to deter-
mine whether true preemption was intended, or whether it reflected basic supremacy prin-
ciples. The provision is ambiguous as to whether the legislative intent was to preempt or to
establish concurrency; however, given the harshness of preemption and the rule that it
must be clearly intended, it is unlikely a court would hold the language establishes either
express or implied preemption.
162. Burkholder, 902 A.2d at 1016.
163. Id. at 1022 n.8 (Friedman, J., dissenting). The dissent also disagreed with the




that the Act preempted local setbacks would obviate the need to
address conflict. Efficiency concerns aside, a more substantive
danger arises in situations where a local ordinance can be read to
be consistent with the state law. The Burkholder dissent, for ex-
ample, would have upheld the zoning ordinance under such a ra-
tionale. However, if the majority had conducted a preemption
analysis and found field preemption that was extensive enough to
ban local land use laws, no local legislation would be allowed, and
there would be no need to discuss conflict. Even though it may
have been construed to be consistent with the NMA, the setback
provision would have been unlawful. Thus, a failure to properly
distinguish between preemption and conflict may, in some cases,
lead courts to uphold local laws that should otherwise be invali-
dated.
Judicial failure to consider the general objectives of competing
environmental and land use laws is also a concern. Not only does
it offend the interpretive canon that directs courts dealing with
conflict to fully consider the consequences of various interpreta-
tions, 64 but it also ignores the general supremacy principle that




Pennsylvania's preemption law is generally stable. After fifty-
plus years, Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Association remains
the cornerstone of preemption and supremacy doctrine. Over the
years, preemption has been increasingly viewed as harsh, and it is
clear that state legislation does not, by itself, create a presumption
of preemption. Pennsylvania decisional law reflects this grudging
attitude toward preemption, recognizing it in only three areas.
Despite this stability, cases continue to intermingle preemption
and supremacy concepts, a practice that can affect both judicial
efficiency and case outcomes. Furthermore, judicial treatment of
the distinction between land use and environmental law remains
unsettled.
The cases do reflect an analytical progression, although no sin-
gle process is consistently applied. Cases like Mars, which
squarely address conflicts between state laws and municipal ordi-
nances on the same subject, have resolved the preemption issue by
164. See Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455.
165. W Pa. Rest. Ass'n, 77 A.2d at 620.
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first interpreting the state legislation. If there is no preemption, a
court will then consider the nature of the local power at issue us-
ing principles of statutory interpretation. If the municipality has
acted within its authority, the court will consider whether the
ordinance is reasonable, and if so, whether it nevertheless con-
flicts with the state law. If there is a conflict, the ordinance will
fail under supremacy principles. Other cases, such as School Dis-
trict of Philadelphia and Ogontz, which deal with overlapping land
use powers, examine local authority before addressing preemption.
The significance of the sequence in which the pieces of a preemp-
tion analysis are analyzed will be discussed more fully in Parts IV
and V.
Regardless of the analytical progression, Ogontz makes clear
that statutory construction is the sole tool for dealing with these
issues. One notable interpretive rule treats state agencies and
local municipalities as equal delegatees of state police powers;
166
another resolves disputes by focusing on the consequences of in-
validating local law. 167 These rules might play a significant role in
resolving disputes if courts would look at competing state and lo-
cal provisions within the larger context of the policies embodied in
enabling legislation. In overlapping land use authority cases, for
example, deference to land use authority and the acknowledgment
that zoning deals with the peculiarities of local communities have
preserved local authority in the face of preemption challenges.
168
In environmental-land use disputes, however, Pennsylvania courts
have not consistently considered the distinction between the poli-
cies underlying land use and environmental regulation, at times
narrowly focusing on specific conflicting provisions in the state
and local laws. In these cases, the "great play" that the courts
otherwise give local land use authority is not always "in play."
This lack of deference to local authority in environmental-land use
disputes is significant because the distinction could defeat a pre-
emption attack if, for example, a court held that express or field
preemption encompassed environmental matters rather than land
use matters. 169 Even in cases in which courts find concurrency,
the distinction might help to avoid the finding of conflict under
similar reasoning. 17
0
166. See City of Pittsburgh, 360 A.2d at 610.
167. See Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455.
168. See Sch.'Dist. of Phila., 207 A.2d at 868.
169. See, e.g., Warner Co., 612 A.2d at 578.
170. See, e.g., Appeal of Hoover, 608 A.2d 607 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
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III. THE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ACT: STATUTORY
PROVISIONS, REGULATIONS, AND CASE LAW
The observations set forth above are played out in SWMA pre-
emption case law. However, these cases are given special atten-
tion because they involve an area where the line separating land
use and environmental regulation is becoming harder to draw.
That lack of clarity has had a determinative effect in a number of
cases. Before those cases are addressed, however, portions of the
Act and regulations will be summarized in order to place the case
law in better context.
A. Pennsylvania's Solid Waste Management Act171 and Munici-
pal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act
172
In enacting the SWMA, the General Assembly was mindful of
the health and environmental dangers caused by the improper
management of solid waste. 173 One of the Act's stated objectives is
the protection of public health, safety, and welfare from improper
solid waste management practices. 174 The Act envisions a coop-
erative venture between the state and local governments in a va-
riety of areas, including solid waste planning. 175 It defines "mu-
nicipalities" as cities, boroughs, incorporated towns, townships,
and counties, 176 and creates three categories of solid waste: mu-
nicipal, residual, and hazardous.1
77
State authority under the Act, which lies with the Department
of Environmental Protection ("DEP"), is extensive. The DEP ad-
ministers a comprehensive solid waste program that addresses the
storage, collection, transport, processing, treatment, and disposal
of solid waste. 178 In carrying out these powers, the DEP issues
permits for municipal, residual, and hazardous waste manage-
ment, 179 as well as for the beneficial processing of waste where
"such use does not harm or present a threat of harm to the health,
171. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6018.101-6018.1003 (2003).
172. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 4000.10-4000.1904 (2003).
173. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6018.102 (2003).
174. § 6018.102(4).
175. Id. at (1).
176. § 6018.103.
177. The definitions of these three types of waste can be found in § 6018.103.
178. § 6018.104(1).
179. §§ 6018.201, 6018.301, 6018.401.
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safety or welfare of the people or environment of this Common-
wealth."
80
Additionally, the Act empowers the Environmental Quality
Board ("EQB") to promulgate rules in furtherance of the Act's ob-
jectives, specifically, to protect the "safety health, welfare, and
property of the public and the air, water and other natural re-
sources of the Commonwealth."'181 Like the DEP, the EQB is di-
rected to use its authority under the Act to protect the environ-
ment and public health of the Commonwealth as a whole. The
EQB also authorizes certificates of public necessity for hazardous
waste treatment facilities, which supersede local zoning or other
land use laws that might otherwise ban such facilities. 182
Municipal regulatory powers over solid waste are set forth in
the Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction
Act. The law authorizes municipalities (other than counties) to
regulate the transportation, collection, and storage of municipal
waste within their borders. 183 Additionally, any ordinance enacted
pursuant to that authority "shall not be less stringent than, and
not in violation of or inconsistent with, the provisions and pur-
poses of the [SWMA]."184 Notably absent from the powers given to
municipalities is the power to regulate the disposal of solid waste.
The SWMA regulations most often at issue in preemption dis-
putes establish setbacks that mandate minimum distances be-
tween solid waste facilities and various land uses and geographic
formations. Setbacks under those regulations exist for five mu-
nicipal solid waste activities: landfills, 85 sewage sludge land ap-
plication, 86 solid waste transfer facilities, 87 general composting
facilities, 88 and resource recovery facilities. 89 Setbacks may be as
small as 100 feet-the minimum distance between a municipal
landfill and a perennial stream or a property line' 90 -and as large
as 10,000 feet-the distance between a landfill and an airport
180. § 6018.104(18) (emphasis added).
181. § 6018.105(a) (emphasis added).
182. Id. at (f), (h).
183. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4000.304 (2008).
184. § 4000.304(b).
185. 25 PA. CODE § 273.202 (2005). There are separate regulations for municipal waste
landfills and construction/demolition waste landfills. See generally PENNSYLVANIA
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & PRACTICE 13-2.2.4 (Terry R. Bossert & Joel R. Burcat eds., 4th ed.
2006).
186. 25 PA. CODE § 275.202 (1997).
187. Id. § 279.202.
188. Id. § 281.202.
189. Id. § 283.202.
190. § 273.202(a)(12), (13).
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runway. 191 The regulations also mandate setbacks from schools
192
and occupied dwellings.1 93 Similar restrictions exist for residual
waste processing and disposal facilities. 94 Even though these re-
strictions are often described as "setbacks," the regulations refer
to them as "areas" where various solid waste activities "[are] pro-
hibited."1 95 In short, the regulations establish areas where solid
waste management activities may not be undertaken based on the
DEP's and EQB's determination that those areas must remain
open to protect the public health and the environment. As such,
they can fairly be described as regulations that restrict the opera-
tion of solid waste facilities based on statewide environmental
concerns, rather than land use regulations.
B. Preemption Cases
Numerous cases have addressed preemption or conflict under
the SWMA. The cases are divided between companion regulation
cases, where municipalities sought to regulate solid waste in order
to supplement the Act, and environmental-land use disputes,
where municipal land use ordinances were challenged as conflict-
ing with the Act.
1. Companion Regulation Cases
In the early 1970s, the Solid Waste Act allowed municipalities
to regulate the disposal of solid waste as long as their ordinances
did not conflict with the Act.1 96 A township's license requirement
was challenged under that Act in Greater Greensburg Sewage Au-
thority v. Hempfield Township.197 The Greensburg Sewage Au-
thority had obtained a state permit for the land application of
sewage sludge but was denied a local license.1 98 Intertwining pre-
191. Id. (a)(14).
192. Id. (a)(18)
193. See, e.g., 25 PA. CODE § 273.202(a)(9),(10) (establishing 900 foot setbacks between
landfill expansions and new landfills and occupied dwellings).
194. See, e.g., 25 PA. CODE § 289.422 (2001) (listing areas where residual waste disposal
impoundments are prohibited).
195. The title of each of the regulations uses this language. See 25 PA. CODE §§ 273.202,
275.202, 279.202, 281.202, 283.202.
196. See Greater Greensburg Sewage Auth. v. Hempfield Twp., 291 A.2d 318, 321 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1972). Some cases predate the 1980 effective date of the current Act but are
discussed because of their handling of preemption issues. As noted in the text above, the
SWMA in its current version does not authorize local regulation of solid waste disposal.
197. 291 A.2d at 319.
198. Id.
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emption and supremacy, the Commonwealth Court stated that the
SWMA "resulted in a limited preemption" of sewage sludge dis-
posal because the statute provided that no municipality could en-
act an ordinance that conflicted with the Commonwealth's licen-
sure requirement. 199 The court cited both the supremacy rule
from Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Association and the field
preemption rule, eventually settling on limited field preemption to
support its holding that the local license requirement was inva-
lid.200 It reasoned that "[aill phases" of the sewage facility's opera-
tions were governed by the state licensure requirements under the
Sewage Facilities Act and the Solid Waste Act. 201
Twelve years later, in Sunny Farms Ltd. v. North Codorus
Township,20 2 the Commonwealth Court construed the SWIA to
establish concurrency rather than preemption.203 A township's
ordinance, enacted under its police power, banned solid waste in-
cineration and land disposal within 500 yards of certain struc-
tures, including dwellings.204 Sunny Farms, which hoped to build
a hazardous waste facility within the setback, brought a preemp-
tion challenge. 20 5 The court held that the SWMA did not expressly
preempt local legislation, with the exception of the certificate of
public necessity provisions that would restrict local prohibitions of
hazardous waste facilities. 20 6 Aside from that limited preemption,
local regulation of solid waste management was permitted as long
as it did "not effect stricter geological and engineering standards
than the state."20 7 The court allowed the local ordinance to stand
under a supremacy analysis because it believed that the scope of
the ordinance, "[a]s with general zoning regulations," included
objectives that were broader than the SWMA's "narrow, technical,
engineering concerns. 208
199. Id. at 321.
200. Id.
201. Greater Greensburg, 291 A.2d at 321.
202. 474 A.2d 56 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
203. Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d at 58.
204. Id. There is some confusion as to whether the ordinance at issue was a police
power regulation or a zoning regulation; however, the better conclusion is that the ordi-
nance was a police power regulation. See Liverpool Twp. v. Stephens, 900 A.2d 1030, 1040-
41 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (Pellegrini, J., dissenting).
205. Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d at 58.
206. Id. at 59. The court relied on Greene Township v. Kuhl, 379 A.2d 1383 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1977), and Moyer's Landfill v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 450 A.2d 273 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1982), for the proposition that the SWMA did not preempt state law. Both cases were
zoning cases.
207. Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d at 59.
208. Id. at 60.
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The Sunny Farms court elaborated on the scope of a municipal-
ity's authority to regulate land use and environmental matters. It
reasoned that the ordinance was aligned with traditional land use
goals because it promoted "public health, property values and aes-
thetics."20 9  In describing municipal environmental powers, the
court noted, "Aesthetics and environmental well-being are impor-
tant aspects of the quality of life in our society, and a key role of
local government is to promote and protect life's quality for all of
its inhabitants."210 The court found no conflict because the ordi-
nance did not address geological and engineering standards and
because the Second Class Township Code authorized the township
to regulate in furtherance of the public health, property values,
and aesthetics. 211 The court drew a clear line between the narrow
geological and engineering standards authorized by the SWMA
and the broader standards restricting location based on a reason-
able exercise of a municipality's police powers.
212
Although Sunny Farms cleared the way for local regulation of
the location of solid waste facilities under municipal police powers,
the case called for a much more exacting review of local regulation
of solid waste facility operations. In the year following the Sunny
Farms decision, two municipal ordinances that attempted to regu-
late the operation of solid waste facilities were invalidated, ex-
tending the preemptive reach of the SWMA. In Municipality of
Monroeville v. Chambers Development Corporation,21 3 a city ordi-
nance that regulated landfill hours of operation was at issue.
214
The Commonwealth Court noted that case law under the current
and prior versions of the Act established that local zoning was not
preempted. 21 5 Monroeville's ordinance, however, attempted to
regulate the operation of the landfill.21 6 The court noted that the
Act called for state and local cooperation and allowed local gov-
ernments to regulate the storage and collection of solid waste, but
was silent on municipal authority to regulate disposal. This si-
lence demonstrated to the court "that the legislature did not in-
tend municipalities to have the power to regulate any aspects of
209. Id. (citing Franklin Twp. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 452 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1982)).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d at 61.
213. 491 A.2d 307 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
214. Monroeville, 491 A.2d. at 309.
215. Id. at 309-10 (citing Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d 56; Kuhl, 379 A.2d 1383; and Greater
Greensburg, 291 A.2d at 318).
216. Id. at 310.
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the operation of a sanitary landfill."217 In a single-paragraph opin-
ion shortly thereafter, the Commonwealth Court invalidated a
Ross Township non-zoning ordinance that similarly attempted to
regulate landfill operations.218 Importantly, both cases expressly
held that the SWIA preempted local regulation of solid waste
disposal,219 apparently foreclosing local regulation of waste dis-
posal operations, even if consistent with the Act. As such, these
cases moved beyond the court's view in Sunny Farms that the
SWMA established a regime of concurrency with the sole excep-
tion relating to the certificate of necessity.
In Hydropress, previously discussed in Section II, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court issued a plurality opinion on the preemptive
scope of the SWIA.220 On one hand, the case solidified intergov-
ernmental cooperation and power sharing as an anti-preemption
indicator. On the other hand, it introduced the threat of balkani-
zation as a rationale for finding implied preemption. The town-
ship ordinance at issue required those engaged in the land appli-
cation of biosolids to be bonded and required landowners, genera-
tors, haulers, and applicators who were not owners to pay for road
improvements. 221 The ordinance was, in essence, a companion
regulation rather than a zoning ordinance. The justices in Hydro-
press who rejected preemption did so because there was no express
language in the SWMA to that effect. 222 They pointed to numer-
ous provisions in the Act that established state and local power
sharing and cooperation, leading them to proclaim, "This is the
language of intergovernmental coordination and cooperation, not
of preemption." 223 These justices never reached the issue of im-
plied preemption nor that of partial preemption of operational
regulations. For them, the pivotal concern was whether the mu-
nicipality had the authority to pass the ordinance, and they held
that it did not.224 Conversely, the justices who held that the Act
217. Id. at 311.
218. Twp. of Ross v. Crown Wrecking Co., Inc., 500 A.2d 1293, 1293 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1985).
219. Monroeville, 491 A.2d at 311 (barring "any" municipal regulation of landfill opera-
tions); Ross, 500 A.2d 1293 (holding that local regulation of landfills was "preempted" by
the Act).
220. Hydropress, 836 A.2d 912 (Pa. 2003).
221. Id. at 914-15. The township was rural and had numerous dirt roads that had not
been improved. Id. at 914.
222. Id. at 918-19.
223. Id. at 919.
224. Id. at 919-20. Relying on Ashenfelder, the Court took a narrow view of municipal
powers, noting that the Second Class Township Code does not delegate unlimited powers to
townships, especially those powers retained by the state. Id. at 919. Using that principle
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preempted local authority read the Act as merely encouraging co-
operation between the state and municipalities, 225 which was con-
siderably less than "an implied delegation of power to units of lo-
cal government to add levels of regulation beyond that which is
specifically authorized in the SWMA." 226 They viewed the Act as
establishing a "pervasive" regulatory program to be administered
by the DEP "as the expert,"227 and rejected concurrency, in part,
because of a fear of a patchwork of "onerous regulations pro-
pounded by the myriad of local governmental entities, unskilled in
this area, which exist in this Commonwealth . .. ,"228
Because it is a plurality opinion, Hydropress has no precedential
effect, a point mentioned in Synagro-WWT, Inc. v. Rush Town-
ship229 later that same year.230 In Synagro, the United States Dis-
trict Court was asked to consider the possible preemption of a lo-
cal ordinance by various federal and state statutes, including the
SWMA. 231 The plaintiff, which treated biosolids and applied them
to mine reclamation sites, had obtained DEP permits for its activi-
ties.232 Thereafter, the township enacted an ordinance regulating
the land application of sewage sludge, purporting to protect its
residents' health, safety, and general welfare by decreasing their
exposure to harmful materials. 233
The federal court recited the rules set forth in Western Pennsyl-
vania Restaurant Association and Mars,234 as well as the five ques-
tions from Duff, describing them as a tool used by "lower Pennsyl-
vania courts" when dealing with "preemption" issues.235 The court
as a guide, the justices held the Township Code could not be read to allow the township to
impose road improvement charges on those who are general users of the road, and further
rejected the bonding requirement because the SWA gives the DEP the authority to re-
quire permit applicants to post financial security. Id. at 920.
225. Hydropress, 836 A.2d at 920-21 (Castile, J., concurring and dissenting).
226. Id. at 920.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 921. Justice Castille, writing for these justices, also agreed that the ordi-
nance was, in any event, ultra vires. Id.
229. Synagro-WWT, Inc. v. Rush Twp., 299 F.Supp.2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
230. Synagro-WWT, 299 F.Supp.2d at 418.
231. Id. at 412-13.
232. Id. at 413.
233. Id. Among other things, the ordinance required applicants to provide the township
with two documents: a site registration, which stated that the application site met all fed-
eral, state, and local regulations pertaining to biosolid land application, and a second called
the land application registration. Id. at 414. To complete the documentation, the applicant
had to submit all DEP permit application information, undertake comprehensive testing of
soil and groundwater, and furnish reports detailing test results. Id.
234. Id. at 416.
235. Synagro-WWT, 299 F.Supp.2d at 416.
Winter 2009
Duquesne Law Review
found no express preemption language in the SWMVIA and pro-
ceeded to a conflict analysis without considering the possibility of
implied preemption. 236 The court then perpetuated the confusion
that marks many of these cases. It acknowledged precedent that
holds that any municipal regulation of solid waste facility opera-
tions is "preempted," but it interpreted those cases to mean that
any regulation that is an obstacle to the objectives of the Act or
"that would impede the day-to-day operations of a waste facility"
was not allowed. 237 This analysis suggests concurrency, not pre-
emption.
The misunderstanding intertwined itself in the court's analysis.
The court held that one provision of the ordinance was "pre-
empted" by the Act because it duplicated DEP permits and was an
obstacle to the Act's "goal of orderly and efficient land application
of sewage sludge."238  However, the court let another provision
stand because it was consistent with the purposes of the Act and
did not conflict with DEP regulations. 239 The court failed to rec-
ognize that, if the SWMA preempts local supplemental regulation,
it would make no difference whether the township's ordinance was
an obstacle or not. Any ordinance that addresses biosolid land
application would be invalid. The court's analysis was clearly
clouded by the Duff questions, particularly those focusing on con-
flict.240
In 2006, the Commonwealth Court confronted these issues yet
again in Liverpool Township v. Stephens,241 a case that perpetu-
ated the preemption/conflict confusion and strained the distinction
between environmental and land use regulation. In Liverpool, the
township's ordinance banned the storage, transfer, collection or
disposal of solid or residual waste without a permit and also regu-
lated the application of processed municipal waste as fertilizer to
farmland by mandating setbacks that were more stringent than
236. See id. at 418-19.
237. Id. at 419. The "obstacle" rule was attributed to Klein v. Straban Twp., 705 A.2d
947, 949-50 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
238. Synagro-WWT, 299 F.Supp.2d at 419 (invalidating the land application registra-
tion). The court also held that provisions in the ordinance setting pH limitations were
preempted since they conflicted with those in the Act. Id. at 421.
239. Id. at 421 (upholding the site registration requirement). Enforcement provisions in
the ordinance were also held valid because the Act intended municipalities to assist the
DEP in compliance matters. Id. at 422.
240. See id. at 419-21.
241. 900 A.2d 1030 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).
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the setbacks included in the SWMA regulations. 242 A landowner
who had obtained a DEP permit for these activities without ob-
taining a local permit was sued by the township. Predictably, the
landowner claimed that he did not need a township permit be-
cause the SWMA preempted local regulation.
243
The court, in an opinion by Judge Leavitt, noted that Hydro-
press was not binding, but pointed out that six justices agreed that
the township in that case had no authority to duplicate DEP's
regulatory program under the SWMA. 244 The court then turned to
Duff s five questions to determine whether there was preemption,
claiming that if any one of the questions was answered affirma-
tively, "then the local ordinance will be found preempted by state
law."245 Again, the court presented the questions as relevant to
preemption alone, not conflict.
The township relied on the absence of preemption language in
the statute as well as the Sunny Farms decision, in which the
same court held that a local setback ordinance did not conflict
with the Act's "engineering or geological standards," in part be-
cause the locally focused objectives of the ordinance differed from
those of the Act. 246 The Liverpool court agreed that the SWMA did
not preempt local zoning regulation, opining that Sunny Farms
involved a zoning ordinance. 247 However, it construed the Liver-
pool ordinance as one that regulated the activity of sludge applica-
tion, rather than its "placement," since it included "geological
standards" that addressed "how[,] when[,] and where sewage
waste may be used to fertilize farmland."248 The court reasoned
that any such standard, if stricter than those in the state regula-
tions, cannot survive. 249 As in Sunny Farms, the court was willing
to uphold local operational regulations that are consistent with
the SWMA, unlike Municipality of Monroeville, in which the court
held that the Act foreclosed all local operational regulation.
250
242. Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1031-32 (noting that the township ordinance barred
land application within 500 yards of a dwelling).
243. Id. at 1032.
244. Id. at 1033.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1035. See discussion of Sunny Farms, infra, where the court distinguished
between the technical objectives of the SWMA regulations and the broader township goals
to protect health, property values, and aesthetics. See supra text accompanying note 207.
247. See Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1035-36.
248. Id. at 1036.
249. Id.




The Liverpool decision initially appears to hinge on the type of
ordinance at issue. Zoning ordinances are permissible, but any
ordinance not so labeled which can be construed as dealing with
operational activities or geological standards will be invalid if it is
more stringent than state law. 251 The court broadly defined opera-
tional regulations to include provisions that specify where sewage
waste may be used as fertilizer.252 Although the opinion initially
described Sunny Farms as a case dealing with a zoning ordinance,
it nevertheless stated that the rule of that case would apply
"[riegardless" of whether Liverpool's ordinance was a zoning ordi-
nance, but only if the ordinance regulated the "placement" of a
solid waste facility in order to protect aesthetics and property val-
ues. 253 As noted, the court instead ruled that the Liverpool ordi-
nance addressed operations. The court arguably was more con-
cerned about what the ordinance addressed than how it was la-
beled. Local restrictions that address the location of solid waste
facilities are permissible whether they are found in environmental
or zoning ordinances. Ordinances that address facility operations,
however, can be no more stringent than state law.
An intermingling of preemption and supremacy concepts per-
meate the Liverpool opinion. The court seemed to have affirma-
tively answered two Duff questions dealing with conflict, yet con-
cluded that the Act "preempted" the ordinance. 254 The court also
claimed that the ordinance not only conflicted with the Act but
also interfered with the goal of "uniform and comprehensive" state
regulation "that leaves no room for side-by-side municipal regula-
tion."255 As in many of these cases, the opinion causes the reader
to ask, 'Which is it, preemption or conflict?" The court never
clearly established that the SWIA preempted local operational
regulation of solid waste facilities, and the court strongly sug-
gested it does not. If it had found preemption, the court could
have ended the discussion by characterizing the ordinance as im-
posing a geological standard as opposed to restricting location, and
there would have been no need to address conflict.
The court's conclusion that a local setback provision was a geo-
logical standard that regulated a solid waste activity is difficult to
accept. In a strong dissenting opinion, Judge Pelligrini argued
251. Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1036.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See id. at 1037-38.
255. Id. at 1038 (citing Duff, 532 A.2d at 505).
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that the ordinance dealt with odor, not geology, and that munici-
palities are authorized to use their police powers to regulate the
placement of sewage sludge.256 He wrote that the General Assem-
bly understood that "administrative regulations issued by DEP do
not take into consideration local conditions and only deal with the
operation of waste sites[.]' 257 He felt that the case was no differ-
ent than Sunny Farms, which characterized the DEP's concerns
under the SWMA as narrow and technological, quite distinct from
township efforts to regulate solid waste facilities to improve the
community's quality of life.258 Importantly, the dissent noted that
a local government's "major responsibility" when regulating envi-
ronmental matters is to address "[a]esthetics and environmental
well-being" as part of community quality of life.
259
Liverpool, which is one of the most recent pronouncements on
preemption and conflict under the SWMA, is also one of the most
confusing. Without any analysis of express or implied preemption,
the majority opinion set forth a conflict analysis and ultimately
concluded that the ordinance was "preempted." The opinion taxes
common sense in its characterization of the township's setback
provision as a geological standard and leaves unresolved the issue
of whether the SWMA's preemptive scope is limited to its restric-
tion on hazardous waste facilities under the certificate of necessity
provisions (as held in Sunny Farms and Synagro) or additionally
forecloses all local regulation of solid waste facility operations, as
held in Greater Greensburg and Municipality of Monroeville.
2. Environmental-Zoning Cases
The Commonwealth Court has consistently upheld local land
use ordinances in the face of preemption challenges brought under
the SWMA. Although these cases have uniformly held that the
Act does not preempt local land use authority, they have left unre-
solved the issue of SWMA preemption of operational regula-
tions.2
60
256. Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1038-40 (Pellegrini, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 1038.
258. Id. at 1040-42.
259. Id. at 1042 (citing Franklin Twp., 452 A.2d at 720).
260. See Se. Chester County Refuse Auth. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 545 A.2d 445, 446-47
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (noting that, under the Act, municipalities may regulate with a goal
of keeping communities safe and clean, but may not impose conditions that will interfere
with a solid waste facility's operation).
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When municipalities have acted within the confines of their
delegated land use authority and avoided operational regulation,
they have invariably prevailed in SWMA preemption disputes. 261
In these cases, the distinction between environmental regulation
and land use regulation is often determinative. One landowner
learned this lesson twice. In Greene Township v. Kuhl,262 the
Commonwealth Court held that a landowner who had obtained a
DEP permit for a landfill also had to seek zoning approval from
the township. 263 The court found no intent in the SWMA to pre-
empt local zoning regulations and cited with approval the trial
court's rationale:
[A] local municipality cannot set geological or engineering
standards stricter than those established by DER for issuance
of its permit. However, factors other than geological ones,
such as those involving aesthetics, population density, and ac-
cessibility[,] govern the selection of a landfill site, and these
factors are the appropriate subject of local land use plan-
ning.2
64
Several years later, the landowner raised the same argument,
this time relying on Greensburg Sewage Authority, where the
court invalidated a local zoning ordinance that attempted to regu-
late sewage facilities. 265 The court easily dismissed the argument,
stating that, unlike the ordinance at issue in Greensburg, the
Greene Township ordinance did not "regulate the means by which
landfills dispose of their waste; it speaks only to where they may
be located."26
6
The Commonwealth Court has repeatedly drawn the line be-
tween the environmental regulation of the SWMA and local zoning
authority. As it stated in a non-preemption case arising under the
Act:
261. Outcomes that are favorable to municipalities depend on compliance with the pro-
cedural requirements of the MPC. See, e.g., Longenecker v. Pine Grove Landfill, Inc., 543
A.2d 215 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988). In Longenecker, a landfill operator challenged a local
setback provision that was included in a non-zoning ordinance. Id. The township had no
comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance. Id. at 215. The court held that the SWMA pre-
served a municipality's power to adopt "appropriate" zoning regulations that address "mat-
ters of a purely local character," but invalidated the ordinance as being an act of zoning
that failed to comply with the MPC's procedural requirements. Id. at 216-17.
262. 379 A.2d 1383 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
263. Greene Twp., 379 A.2d at 1384.
264. Id. at 1385.
265. Kuhl v. Commonwealth, 467 A.2d 912, 913 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
266. Kuhl, 467 A.2d at 913.
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The grant of a permit by the DER is not tantamount to a zon-
ing permit. To hold otherwise, would undercut the purpose of
a zoning board in reviewing whether a proposed use would be
contrary to a particular zoning district's citizens' health, safety
and welfare.26
7
Thus, it is not surprising that in Hill v. Zoning Hearing
Board,268 the court allowed a zoning authority, when authorizing
the expansion of a solid waste facility that was a preexisting use,
to impose land use conditions on the facility even though the use
was permitted by the DER.
269
In 2006, the Commonwealth Court decided yet another case
challenging setback and height restrictions in a local zoning ordi-
nance. In Southeastern Chester County Refuse Authority v. Zoning
Hearing Board,270 the Refuse Authority, which had been operating
a landfill that failed to comply with a 200-foot zoning setback, ap-
plied for an expansion permit. 271 The township denied the appli-
cation based on zoning setbacks that were more stringent than the
setbacks included in the SWMA regulations.27 2 The court upheld
the zoning board's denial, reiterating that the regulations did not
preempt local zoning ordinance provisions "that are consistent
with basic land use planning principles promoting and protecting
the public health, property values, and aesthetics."
273
In these environmental-land use preemption cases under the
SWMA, local action is more easily tolerated than it is in compan-
ion regulation cases, where often it is either struck down as opera-
tional or subjected to scrutiny under principles of conflict. This
difference is illustrated in Township of Plymouth v. County of
Montgomery,274 a case involving a challenge brought against four
267. Abbey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 559 A.2d 107, 111 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (emphasis
in original) (upholding, against a citizen challenge, a zoning board's approval of a waste-to-
energy facility as a special exception).
268. 597 A.2d 1245 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
269. Hill, 597 A.2d at 1252. The facility was a valid preexisting use. Id. at 1248. The
conditions prohibited obnoxious odors and mandated that the facility be kept clean and that
trash transfers and compacting occur inside the building. Id. at 1252. Nevertheless, the
court invalidated other conditions purported to address land use because there was no
evidence they furthered the promotion of the public health, safety, or welfare. Id. at 1252-
53 (holding sound barrier requirement unlawful). The case serves as a reminder that any
exercise of the zoning authority must be rationally related to the police powers.
270. 898 A.2d 680 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006), appeal denied, 921 A.2d 499 (Pa. 2007).
271. Chester County Refuse Auth., 898 A.2d at 683.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 686.
274. Twp. of Plymouth v. County of Montgomery, 531 A.2d 49 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987),
appeal denied, 554 A.2d 513 (Pa. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1021 (1989).
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ordinances, including both companion environmental ordinances
and zoning ordinances. In order for Montgomery County to con-
struct a waste management facility in Plymouth Township, the
township amended its zoning ordinance to create a resource recov-
ery district that would allow a 165-foot-high, 1,200-ton-capacity
facility.275 The county adopted a plan that complied with the
amendment, but the township, responding to community opposi-
tion, repealed the amended ordinance and enacted three new or-
dinances in its place. 276 The first of the three, a non-zoning ordi-
nance, regulated waste processing disposal and required proces-
sors to obtain permits; the second was a zoning measure that set
maximum height and setback limits and made resource recovery
facilities conditional uses with a 250-ton-per-day capacity; and the
third shrunk the size of the original district by more than 90 per-
cent.277 The township also had another relevant ordinance, en-
acted under the MPC and township code, which, among other
things, required the facility to obtain building and sewer connec-
tion permits.
278
The court had little trouble invalidating the first ordinance un-
der a pure preemption rationale. It noted that regulations per-
taining to the operation of a facility did "not fall within the cate-
gory of land use controls accomplished by zoning[] under the
MPC," and stated that Municipality of Monroeville established the
difference between operational regulations and those dealing with
the location of a facility. 279 Thus, the first ordinance was invalid,
as were the capacity, design, and size limits in the second ordi-
nance. 280 The court stated that the DER's "pervasive powers" un-
der the SWMNA "preempted" local operational regulations that ad-
dress "transportation processing, treatment and disposal of solid
waste."28
1
The court proceeded to discuss the land use powers of the town-
ship. It noted that the only land use matter preempted by the
SWMA involved the certificate of public necessity provision.
282 It
further acknowledged the importance of statutory interpretation
275. Plymouth, 531 A.2d at 51-52.
276. Id. at 52.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 53.
279. Id. at 53-54 (citing Municipality of Monroeville, 491 A.2d 307 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1985)).
280. Plymouth, 531 A.2d at 54-55.
281. Id. at 54.
282. Id. at 55.
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in these cases, especially the canon that authorizes courts to con-
sider, "among other things, the consequences of a particular inter-
pretation."28 3 The court feared that a liberal approach to preemp-
tion could subordinate local zoning authority and frustrate mu-
nicipal planning.28 4 Furthermore, the imposition of zoning restric-
tions on a facility owner would not frustrate a state regulatory
scheme because one site could be substituted for another.285 Nev-
ertheless, the court held that the second and third ordinances
amounted to spot zoning because they targeted a particular parcel
of land without regard for the promotion of the police powers.
28 6
More specifically, the ordinances imposed exceedingly burdensome
requirements on the resource recovery district and significantly
decreased its size. The general land use provisions of the fourth
ordinance, on the other hand, were permissible as long as they
were not abused.
287
Township of Plymouth neatly captures the strains of preemption
and conflict that drive these cases. The opinion emphasized that
the SWMA imposed a regime of partial preemption by preempting
local land use regulation to the extent of the certificate of need
provisions as well as local operational regulations. 28 That issue
remains unclear, however, because Liverpool, also decided in 2006,
suggests that consistent municipal operational regulations may be
permissible under the SWMA. What is certain from these cases is
that legitimate land use regulations are not preempted by the Act
and will generally prevail in a conflict dispute, even if specific pro-
visions conflict with similar provisions in a SWMA regulation.
IV. SYNTHESIS: QUESTIONS, THEMES, SUGGESTIONS
Although it is possible to elicit some fairly stable legal principles
from the SWMA case law and preemption cases, the cases merit
further discussion in light of the convergence of land use and envi-
ronmental policies that marks many of the disputes.
283. Id. at 55-56 (citing Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455).
284. Id. at 55-56.
285. Plymouth, 531 A.2d at 56 (citing Ozontz, 483 A.2d at 455).
286. Id. at 56-57 (holding that spot zoning ignores the "community-wide perspective"
that is required of any exercise of the zoning power).
287. Id. at 58.
288. Although Township of Plymouth clearly spoke of preemption of local operational
regulation, other cases have suggested state and local concurrency in the matter of opera-
tional regulations. See, e.g., Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d at 59.
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A. Questions and Concerns
1. Preemption/Conflict Confusion
A fair number of the cases discussed previously reflect a lack of
clarity about the distinction between preemption and conflict.28 9
The confusion is typically revealed in statements to the effect that,
if a local law conflicts with state legislation, then it is pre-
empted. 290 Other Pennsylvania cases have similarly held that im-
plied preemption exists if a state law materially conflicts with lo-
cal law.29' Yet, a determination of preemption forecloses any and
all local law, even if the law is otherwise valid. If the SWMA pre-
empts local regulation of solid waste facility operations, then there
can be no local operational legislation at all. If, on the other hand,
the Act intends concurrency in the realm of facility operations, a
local government may use its police power to enact supplemental
operational regulations that are consistent with the SWMA and
its regulations. Under this rationale, local companion ordinances
that supplement the SWMA with additional documentation re-
quirements have withstood scrutiny.292 Even this type of ordi-
nance, however, would be invalid if preemption were intended.
The confusion has become entrenched in Commonwealth Court
jurisprudence by way of the Duff questions, which comingle in-
quiries that are relevant to both preemption and conflict while
claiming that they relate solely to preemption. 293 Because an af-
firmative answer to any one question results in a finding of pre-
emption, 294 a court might proclaim a local ordinance to be pre-
empted if it conflicts with a state law, regardless of the intent to
preempt. 29
5
Equating conflict with preemption is fairly widespread. It is
common to read statements to the effect that a state law that con-
flicts with federal law is preempted. 296 Extrapolating this concept
to the state-municipality setting would mean that local laws that
289. See, e.g., Synagro-WWT, 299 F.Supp.2d at 419; Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1037.
290. See supra text accompanying note 251.
291. The cases often refer to this as "conflict preemption." See Nutter v. Dougherty, 938
A.2d 401, 404 (Pa. 2007).
292. See Synagro-WWT, 299 F.Supp.2d at 421 (upholding a local site registration re-
quirement in a local solid waste ordinance).
293. See supra text accompanying note 229.
294. Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1033.
295. See, e.g., Synagro-WWT, 299 F.Supp.2d at 419. Furthermore, Synagro-WWT
showed that the reach of the Duff questions extends beyond the Commonwealth Court.
296. Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 809-10.
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actually conflict with state laws would also be preempted. Such
statements, which encapsulate a rule sometimes referred to as
"conflict preemption," are confusing and imprecise because conflict
rules are grounded in supremacy and have nothing to do with pre-
emption.297 The rationale behind these statements has substance,
however, if conflict were to be understood as "provid[ing] the nec-
essary evidence for implying [legislative] intent to preempt [local]
law[.]" 298 Under this reasoning, implied preemption exists if there
is a conflict between a state and local land use regulation. 299 The
danger of conflict preemption is that it negates the idea of su-
premacy. If conflict equates to preemption, then what role is left
for supremacy?300 Moreover, a search for conflict to establish pre-
emption may distract courts from searching for express preemp-
tion language or field occupation. 301 Because a conflict analysis is
proper only where no express or implied preemption is present,
the concept of conflict preemption is self-contradictory and should
be abandoned. 30 2
The preemption/conflict confusion should be addressed not only
for certainty in the law but also for judicial efficiency. If a state
statute either expressly or impliedly preempts local legislation,
courts have no need to address the scope of local authority or the
often thorny question of conflict. If, for example, the SWMA pre-
empts local operational regulations, a court might easily dispense
with any local law that it characterized as dealing with opera-
tional matters. No further analysis would be required.
2. Analytical Consistency
Further clarity might be accomplished through a consistent pro-
gression in preemption and conflict analysis. To a great extent,
Pennsylvania's preemption cases suggest such a progression. In
some cases, courts have addressed the preemption issue first; if
there is no preemption, they proceeded to a supremacy analysis,
focusing on local authority to act and, if the action was authorized,
the reasonableness of the action.30 3 In other cases, notably those
297. Id. at 809 (referring to the misunderstanding as "sloppy and contradictory").
298. Id.
299. See 3 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 48:4, Implied Preemption
(4th ed. 2007-2008).




303. See, e.g., Mars, 740 A.2d at 196.
Winter 2009
Duquesne Law Review
involving overlapping land use authority, courts have focused first
on the type of power exercised by the municipality and then con-
sidered the preemption issue.
30 4
In a number of cases, however, courts have shortchanged the
preemption analysis. They have first looked for express preemp-
tion and, finding none, moved to the supremacy issue.30 5 Because
preemption can be implied or express, courts need to consider
whether a state law that does not expressly preempt local action
nevertheless occupies the field. It was a field preemption finding,
for example, that led three justices in Hydropress to hold that the
SWVMA preempts all local regulation. 30 6 Cases like Synagro, how-
ever, miss this important step.
30 7
There is perhaps no substantive difference between deciding
preemption first and doing so after a discussion of local authority,
especially if a court deals with express and implied preemption
and carefully distinguishes between preemption and conflict. In
either case, the correct result can be obtained. The harshness of
and strong presumption against preemption, however, create a
legal environment that is generally favorable to local legislative
authority.308 Analyzing local powers before asking whether those
powers have been stripped by state law would place the preemp-
tion question in better context than would the reverse analysis. If
an examination of the precise local powers at issue comes first, the
preemption question is better focused on those powers.
Such an approach would be particularly helpful as state and lo-
cal environmental and land use interests converge. In cases of
conflict between a local land use law and a state environmental
law, a local-authority-first approach might assist a court in prop-
erly rejecting preemption based on the uniqueness of local land
use authority. By the same token, the approach might facilitate a
finding of preemption in companion regulation disputes. An ex-
amination of local power before a preemption analysis would ar-
guably lead to fuller consideration of the local power at issue and a
more conservative approach to preemption.
A final benefit to an analysis that first examines local authority
is increased judicial efficiency. By first addressing local authority,
304. See, e.g., Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 451-52.
305. See, e.g., Hydropress, 836 A.2d at 918-19 (noting the lack of express terms of pre-
emption in the SWMA); but see id. at 920 (plurality opinion, finding field preemption).
306. Id. at 920.
307. See supra text accompanying note 230.
308. See, e.g., Mars, 740 A.2d at 195-96.
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courts could avoid dealing with preemption altogether. This sce-
nario would occur if it were determined that a local ordinance was
either ultra vires or unreasonable. In either case, courts would
never need to address the preemption issue, which would comport
with the norm that favors avoidance of constitutional issues
whenever possible.
30 9
3. Indicia of Conflict
There is a serious need for Pennsylvania courts to elaborate on
the factors that are relevant to conflict. That need is intensifying
as land use and state and local environmental legislation continue
to overlap. It is clear that, if a state program is intended to oper-
ate concurrently with municipal legislation, otherwise-valid local
ordinances will nevertheless be struck down if they are inconsis-
tent with or in conflict with state law.310 Ogontz makes clear that
statutory interpretation is the sole tool to be used in making a con-
flict determination. 311 In that regard, Pennsylvania courts have
often turned to Pennsylvania's Statutory Construction Act to help
resolve conflict scenarios.
Ogontz, an overlapping land use case, preserved a local land use
ordinance by resorting to the canon of construction that asks
courts to consider the consequences of invalidating conflicting
laws. 31 2 The Court held that local zoning authority would be frus-
trated if it were routinely subordinated in cases where state pro-
grams conflict with municipal action.313 The same rule of inter-
pretation would arguably help preserve local land use authority in
environmental-land use disputes as well, but this result would not
be guaranteed.
314
The matter becomes more complex in environmental-land use
disputes where a state environmental law envisions coordination
with local authorities. In Township of Plymouth, for example, the
Commonwealth Court chose not to consider the consequences of
usurping local land use powers even though it acknowledged that
the SWMA affirms local zoning authority. It did so largely be-
309. See, e.g., Procito v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 945 A.2d 261, 266 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2008). For example, the lead Hydropress opinion may have avoided its preemption discus-
sion altogether by first determining that the municipality acted beyond its authority. 836
A.2d 912.
310. See, e.g., W. Pa. Rest. Ass'n, 77 A.2d at 620.
311. Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455.
312. Id. (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c)(6) (2003)).
313. Id.
314. See Plymouth, 531 A.2d at 56.
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cause the Act intended local land use powers relating to solid
waste facilities to be integrated with the statewide program, an
objective the court described as a "complicating factor" in the con-
flict analysis. 315 The rationale implies that unfettered land use
authority may frustrate the power-sharing objectives of the
SWMA. If so, courts should carefully consider not only the conse-
quences to local land use objectives if state law were to prevail but
also the consequences to state law objectives if local regulation
were freely allowed. Because the Township of Plymouth court ul-
timately invalidated the local zoning ordinance as spot zoning, the
language that gave less deference to local land use goals in light of
the cooperative policies of the SWMA is arguably dicta. The con-
cept might nevertheless surface in other environmental-land use
disputes over state programs involving coordinated action with
municipalities, facilitating a finding of conflict while diminishing
local land use authority. The degree to which this derogation of
local power is possible has yet to be resolved.
Because conflict is so dependent on statutory interpretation,
there are other provisions of the Statutory Construction Act that
might prove relevant in environmental-land use cases.316 The Act
applies only to statutes, which are specifically defined to be acts of
the General Assembly. 317 Thus, within the context of this discus-
sion, the guides set forth in the Statutory Construction Act apply
to comparisons between state environmental laws and the legisla-
tion that authorizes local land use authority, which in most cases
is the MPC. For example, although Pennsylvania courts might
rely on the Act to resolve conflicts between DEP setback regula-
tions under the SWMVA and conflicting local zoning setbacks, it is
preferable to step back and compare the enabling language of the
SWMA with that of the MPC. From that perspective, the question
becomes whether a law giving local governments authority to ad-
315. Id. at 56.
316. Legislative intent is the polestar of statutory interpretation in Pennsylvania, and to
the extent that the plain language of a statute indicates intent, it must be followed. 1 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(b). When intent is not clear, courts are to consider not only the
consequences of a given interpretation, but also the aim of a statute and what it seeks to
prevent. § 1921(c). Because the SWMA (and arguably all of Pennsylvania's environmental
statutes) is concerned with statewide health and environmental protection, and zoning
legislation, in contrast, empowers municipalities to address matters that are of a local
nature, see supra text accompanying notes 40, 45, courts are not free to discount local land
use powers when they conflict with a state environmental law. If at all possible, courts are
directed to address interpretive issues in ways that give effect to an entire statute, which
again requires courts to uphold legitimate exercises of land use authority. See § 1922.




dress local aesthetics, property values, and general welfare can
coexist with one that has a statewide environmental focus. This
approach is conceptually quite different from asking whether a
state environmental regulation with a 100-foot setback conflicts
with a 200-yard setback in a local zoning ordinance. The primary
concern in conflict determinations should be the legislative intent
of the laws that authorize the state regulations and local ordi-
nances, not the intent behind specific provisions drafted pursuant
to those laws.
Even if the conflict is between a state environmental setback
and a more onerous setback imposed in a local regulation, there is
yet another question: Does the mere fact that a local land use or-
dinance is stricter than a state regulation create conflict? If the
local setback is included in a legitimately enacted land use ordi-
nance, courts will generally uphold the ordinance by distinguish-
ing local land use authority from state environmental objectives. 318
If, however, local setbacks are included in a police power regula-
tion meant to supplement the SWAIA, courts may instead find con-
flict with state law. In Liverpool, for example, the court invali-
dated a more stringent local setback provision once it determined
that it was a geological standard. 319 The court never asked
whether the state regulations established a floor beyond which
local governments could regulate, a possibility raised in the
Burkholder dissent.
320
4. Negation of Supremacy Analysis
In cases where no preemption exists and courts confront concur-
rency, disputes are often presented as involving the Common-
wealth and a municipality, with the understanding that the
Commonwealth will prevail where conflict exists. 321 In a few
cases, however, courts have presented the parties as equal agents
of the Commonwealth. 322 In these instances, what remains are
conflicting exercises of authority under two different enabling
acts, and supremacy is no longer the issue. Under this analysis, a
municipality might fare better than it would under a traditional
supremacy analysis, where it would have to yield if conflict were
found. If, instead, a municipality's delegated powers under the
318. See, e.g., SECCRA, 898 A.2d at 683.
319. Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1036.
320. Burkholder, 902 A.2d at 1022 n.8 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
321. See, e.g., id.
322. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh, 360 A.2d at 610.
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MPC were to be pitted against the DEP's powers delegated under
an environmental law, the issue could be characterized as one of
pure conflict without supremacy overtones. Statutory interpreta-
tion would still be the determining factor, but no one party would
have a superior position. The extent to which the equal-state-
agent theme will reappear is uncertain, but local authorities
might turn to such a rationale to even the playing field in these
disputes.
These issues may well be resolved in the years to come. Ideally,
any resolution will preserve the important distinctions between
statewide and local objectives and between environmental and
land use regulation.
B. Themes, Observations, and State Response
Despite its uncertainties, Pennsylvania preemption and su-
premacy law offers a number of clear principles and themes. In
addition, the Commonwealth has taken steps to coordinate envi-
ronmental permitting with local land use provisions. These
themes and developments are discussed below.
1. Case Law Principles
What drives preemption decisions ranges from a desire to main-
tain the proper constitutional balance between various levels of
government 323 to a desire to implement political ideologies.
324
These objectives are found both in express statements and by
reading between the lines.
Nevertheless, the core themes are quite clear. Case law empha-
sizes the harshness and rarity of preemption and the absence of
any presumption of preemptive intent.325 Increasingly, preemp-
tion and supremacy issues are resolved solely by statutory inter-
pretation. 326 In addition to finding cases of total preemption,
327
courts will parse statutes to find instances of limited preemption,
as has been done with the SWMA. 328 Scholars further agree that
323. Spence & Murray, supra note 2, at 1127 (describing preemption as dealing with
conflicts between federal and state power).
324. See id. at 1128-29.
325. See Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1040.
326. See, e.g., Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455.
327. See, e.g., Hilovsky, 108 A.2d at 707 (holding total preemption of alcohol regulation).




preemption decisions should be guided, at least in part, by a desire
to promote stability and certainty.
329
Additional themes emerge from cases involving state preemp-
tion of local environmental or land use legislation. It is these
cases that explore the growing intersection of land use and envi-
ronmental objectives. Regardless of whether a dispute deals with
a local ordinance providing for companion environmental regula-
tion or one expressly tied to land use, courts have consistently rec-
ognized municipalities' authority to deal with local concerns and
the peculiarities of place. 330 Courts have acknowledged that local
environmental regulations better address "unique local character-
istics which higher levels of government are often unable to con-
sider because of the need to generalize regulations across greater
geographic areas."3 1 The same is true for local land use ordi-
nances. Courts have not only recognized the uniquely local focus
of zoning,332 but have deferred to what they see as the lead role
local governments play in land use matters. 333 The special status
afforded to local land use powers is embodied in statements to the
effect that local land use authority is generally not affected by
state environmental laws. 334 This view has led Pennsylvania
courts to protect local land use ordinances against preemption
challenges under the SWMA.335
2. Other Themes and Considerations
Two final considerations are raised here, one dealing with pre-
emption, one with supremacy. It is clear that, at least to some
degree, preemption law reflects political realities. A decade ago,
Professor David Spence and Professor Paula Murray conducted an
empirical study to determine what drove judicial thinking in fed-
eral preemption decisions. 336 They were curious about a possible
link between the large number of Republican judges on the federal
329. See Thomas R. Head, III, Local Regulation of Animal Feeding Operations: Concerns,
Limits, and Options for Southeastern States, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 503, 574 (Feb. 2000); Buzbee,
supra note 17, at 1590.
330. See, e.g., Abbey, 559 A.2d at 111; see also SECCRA, 898 A.2d at 683 (upholding
zoning ordinance based on township authority to address the general welfare of the com-
munity).
331. See Yanggen & Amrhein, supra note 15, at 7.
332. See Greene Twp., 379 A.2d at 1385.
333. See, e.g., Benham, 523 A.2d at 315 (giving zoning ordinances "great play"); see also
Yanggen & Amrhein, supra note 15, at 43.
334. Yanggen & Amrhein, supra note 15, at 47, 49-50; Buzbee, supra note 17, at 1568.
335. See SECCRA, 898 A.2d at 683.
336. Spence & Murray, supra note 2.
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bench and the strong number of cases that preempted state and
local laws.337 Their findings suggested that, regardless of political
affiliation, judges chose to preempt more often than not,338 opting
for a Coasean outcome of less regulation that favors private solu-
tions. 339 They also found that the characteristics of a case and
personal ideology influenced outcomes, 340 and that judges typically
deferred to agencies in cases where agencies took a position on
preemption. 341 In conclusion, judicial ideologies were clearly at
work in preemption cases.
342
There is another political motivation in preemption cases that
perhaps contributes to the large number of pro-preemption cases.
A local authority might challenge the legislation of higher levels of
government to score political points, even when its case is weak.
343
Politically driven litigation strategies and case outcomes fashioned
by judicial ideology are realities to consider when determining
how, if at all, preemption rules might be modified.
A final consideration addresses supremacy, not preemption, and
it relates to legislators, not judges. Legislatures may fail to ad-
dress preemption and concurrency altogether,344 but other times
may expressly indicate their intent.345 In cases where a legisla-
ture intends to allow concurrent local regulation, it may fail to
clarify the level of local authority that is authorized. One possibil-
ity is to allow local regulation in the same area that is no more
stringent than the state standards. In such a case, the state law
creates a ceiling above which municipalities may not regulate.
346
337. See id. at 1165-67.
338. Id.
339. Id. A Coasean perspective, named after economist Ronald Coase, reflects his influ-
ential work, which theorized that private actors can address certain environmental prob-
lems more efficiently than the government. A contrasting view is attributed to economist
A.C. Pigou, who argued that governmental response was necessary to address the social
costs associated with environmental harms. Id. at 1154-55.
340. Id. at 1194.
341. Spence & Murray, supra note 2 at 1194 (also noting judges pay less deference to the
enacting Congress as time passes by).
342. Id. at 1130, 1162. Rather than focusing on decisional rules, they sought to explain
preemption case outcomes based on numerous variables, including "principles of federal-
ism .... statutory interpretation problems,... political pressures, and ... judges' political
or policy preferences and attitudes toward regulation." Id. at 1162.
343. Id. at 1160-61.
344. For example, the General Assembly did not expressly deal with preemption in the
SWMA. See Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d at 59 (noting that the SWMA's certificate of need
provision is the only exception).
345. Warner Co., 612 A.2d at 580-81; see also Buzbee, supra note 17, at 1555 (noting that
little attention has been given to the issue).
346. See Buzbee, supra note 17, at 1552. Professor Buzbee's article addresses federal
preemption of state and local legislation, but its arguments are no less relevant to state and
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The alternative is concurrent regulation where state law serves as
a floor that allows local regulation as long it is no less stringent.347
When legislatures fail to indicate which type of concurrency is au-
thorized, courts must make the determination by applying princi-
ples of conflict, often with inconsistent results. 348 Indeed, the dif-
ferent outcomes in Sunny Farms and Liverpool Township would
likely have been avoided had the General Assembly clarified the
extent of concurrent municipal authority in the SWIA.
Professor William Buzbee, who has addressed this issue in
depth in relation to federal and state concurrency, points out that
legislatures should consider whether floor or ceiling regulation
schemes best suit the objectives of the law. Environmental re-
gimes often create concurrent, multilayered institutional struc-
tures that tap the expertise of various levels of government and
diverse decision makers. 349 Because multiple governmental insti-
tutions are generally involved in these programs, legislatures
should consider to what extent local action should be restricted, if
at all.
There are reasons to embrace and reject both models. Statewide
standards beyond which local regulation may not venture are effi-
cient because they ensure stability and reduce litigation costs. 350
Not only does the marketplace benefit, but so too do agencies and
legislators (who might stand to gain politically). 351 The benefits of
local legislative conflicts. He refers to federal laws that allow state and local concurrency
within federal limits as "ceiling preemption" and "unitary federal choice preemption" inter-
changeably, see id. at 1554-55, when those laws do not preempt state and local law at all.
Nevertheless, his arguments may be aptly applied to supremacy issues.
347. See id. at 1551-52 (referring to regulatory floors as "one-way ratchets" that allow
more stringent regulation).
348. See Head, supra note 325, at 547-49 (describing two Minnesota cases dealing with
state laws that regulated animal feedlot operations, one holding that more restrictive town-
ship setbacks conflicted with state law because they would prohibit the construction of the
plaintiffs facility, Bd. of Supervisors v. ValAdCo, 504 N.W.2d 267, 269-70 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993), and the other upholding a county setback provision because it did not prohibit what
the state law authorized and thus there was no conflict, Blue Earth County Pork Prod., Inc.
v. County of Blue Earth, 558 N.W.2d 25, 26, 28-30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)).
349. See Buzbee, supra note 17, at 1565 (describing state involvement in federal envi-
ronmental laws such as the Clean Water Act under the principle of "cooperative federal-
ism").
350. See id. at 1590. Again, although Professor Buzbee's arguments were made in refer-
ence to conflicts between federal and state and/or local regulation, they are also applicable
to state and local regulatory conflicts.
351. Buzbee explained: "If Congress or an agency becomes the only game in town, it will
attract greater attention from affected industry as well as other supporting or opposed
stakeholders. Legislators may benefit from electoral or monetary support. Agencies may
be able to secure expanded budgets or even engage in outright favoritism to affected indus-
try in exchange for the usual rewards of regulatory capture . Id. at 1590 (footnotes
omitted).
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setting state standards as a floor are equally compelling; they cre-
ate opportunities for positive interaction among multiple actors,
broad-based participation, and a level of accountability that may
force program modification when the state, left to its own devices,
might choose to maintain the status quo. 352 State standards that
set maximum ceilings ignore the opportunities that multilayered
environmental schemes create and may perpetuate regulatory
stasis on the part of state actors. 353 Regulatory floors, on the other
hand, visit hardship on industry by imposing multiple local stan-
dards that threaten market certainty and place authority in the
hands of provincial decision makers who might lack resources or
expertise.
354
Professor Buzbee offers a detailed decision-making framework
to assist legislatures in determining whether a law should set a
regulatory ceiling or floor. Among its factors are institutional ca-
pabilities, the nature of the regulatory challenge, the regulatory
target, "issues of scale," data needs, and the nature of the risk the
law targets. 355 Together, these considerations can lead to better-
informed concurrency decisions.
3. DEP Response to MPC Amendments of 2000
Recently, the DEP has taken steps to deal with environmental-
land use conflicts. The MPC, which applies to all Pennsylvanian
municipalities but Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia
County,35 6 was amended in 2000 in an attempt to coordinate state
agency actions with local land use planning. Section 10619.2 of
the MPC provides:
When a county adopts a comprehensive plan . . . and any mu-
nicipalities therein have adopted comprehensive plans and zoning
ordinances . . ., Commonwealth agencies shall consider and may
rely upon comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances when re-
viewing applications for the funding or permitting of infrastruc-
ture or facilities.
357
352. See id. at 1588-89.
353. See id. at 1584-85.
354. See id. at 1582-83, 1600.
355. Buzbee, supra note 17, at 1601-03.
356. See supra note 41; see also Final Revision of Policy for Consideration of Local Com-
prehensive Plans and Zoning Ordinances in DEP Review of Permits for Facilities and Infra-
structure, Document Number 012-0200-001 (DEP Policy Office March 6, 2004) available at
www.dep.state.pa.us [hereinafter DEP Land Use Policy].
357. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10619.2 (2008).
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In 2004, the DEP issued its Final Revision of Policy for Consid-
eration of Local Comprehensive Plans and Zoning Ordinance in
DEP Review of Permits for Facilities and Infrastructure, which
implemented section 10619.2.358 The Policy instituted a land use
review process for specified permit authorizations and requires
permit applicants to answer a number of land use questions in a
General Information Form (GIF) that all applicants are required
to complete as part of the permitting process. 3 59 The Policy also
gives municipalities the opportunity to comment on applicant re-
sponses to the questions.
360
The process is subject to a number of limitations. It only applies
if the facility that is the subject of the application satisfies at least
one of three conditions: 1) it is in a county with a comprehensive
plan, and the municipality has a comprehensive plan or is part of
a multi-municipal comprehensive plan, and the municipality has
enacted zoning ordinances, and the ordinances and comprehensive
plan are consistent with the MPC; 2) the municipality has a joint
zoning ordinance; or 3) the municipality has adopted zoning ordi-
nances as part of a cooperative agreement. 361 Furthermore, the
review process only applies to permit authorizations for facilities
enumerated in the Policy's Appendix A, which, among others, in-
cludes facilities under the air quality and solid waste programs.
362
If these conditions are satisfied, the applicant must respond to a
series of questions that ask whether the proposed facility will be
consistent with the comprehensive plan, whether the applicant
will have to obtain zoning approval, and whether any relevant
zoning ordinances are the subject of litigation.363 Applicants are
encouraged to provide the DEP with copies of zoning or other land
use approvals. 364 Municipalities may comment on proposed pro-
jects, and the DEP will attempt to contact them to discuss rele-
vant planning and zoning matters. 365 The DEP will rely on infor-
358. DEP Land Use Policy, supra note 352.
359. Id. at 3.
360. Id.
361. Id. at ii.
362. Id. at Appendix A. Notably, the land use review process applies to facilities manag-
ing hazardous, municipal, and residual waste. Id.
363. DEP Land Use Policy, supra note 352, at 3-4.
364. Id. at 4. Applicants can opt out of the process by submitting land use approval
letters from the municipality with the GIF form. Id. at 7.
365. Id. at 5.
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mation it obtains from municipalities to determine whether there
is a conflict with local planning or zoning.
366
The goal of the land use review process is "to avoid or minimize
conflicts between department permit decisions and local land use
decisions."367 Importantly, the Policy specifically recognizes the
difference between regulating certain facilities "as particular regu-
lated activities" and local land use regulation, and the Policy fur-
ther states that "[1local municipalities can establish valid zoning
requirements that can be imposed on these activities where state
law preempts local regulation of these activities."368 With this dis-
tinction in mind, the Policy imposes a mandatory duty on the DEP
to consider comprehensive plans and zoning as part of the permit-
ting process.
369
In cases of conflict, permit reviewers must notify the DEP Policy
Office, which has numerous response options, including recom-
mending the suspension of the permit review process until the
conflict is resolved, and providing guidance to the permit review
staff as to whether the permit "should be approved, approved with
a condition, or denied."370 The DEP has read the MPC provision to
give it discretion in terms of how it chooses to rely on local plan-
ning and zoning.
371
These new procedures have the potential to avoid the type of
disputes that have led to litigation in the past. But they are not a
panacea. First, the Policy has no effect on preemption; only the
General Assembly and the courts may determine whether state
law forecloses all local authority in an area. Furthermore, al-
though the Policy addresses supremacy and conflict, it only
reaches conflicts between state environmental programs and land
use ordinances. It does not address conflicts between state envi-
ronmental programs and local supplemental environmental legis-
lation, such as the dispute in Sunny Farms. Finally, even if a
permit conflicts with a local land use ordinance, the Policy only
366. Id. at 5-6. In Berks County v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., the Commonwealth Court held
that the DEP fulfilled its obligations under the MPC by relying on the municipality's si-
lence and the permittee's response on the land use questionnaire to the effect that a zoning
conflict had been resolved. 894 A.2d 183, 195 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006), appeal denied, 904
A.2d 1104 (Pa. 2006). The court further held that the MPC provision did not require the
DEP to engage in its own legal review of a related settlement agreement between the per-
mittee and municipality. Id.
367. DEP Land Use Policy, supra note 352, at 7-8.
368. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
369. Id. at 7-8.
370. Id. at 8.
371. Id. at 9.
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applies if the facility falls into one of the three geographic catego-
ries and if the permit sought is listed in Appendix A.
The DEP's experience with the Policy has been positive-but
limited. The process has worked well when a municipality has a
zoning ordinance and is aware of the process. 72 When the Policy
Office has chosen to insert permit conditions in cases of conflict, it
has been able to clarify that the permit is conditioned on compli-
ance with local land use restrictions.373 Still, as of the writing of
this article, the Policy Office has yet to deal with a conflict be-
tween SWIA setbacks and local zoning ordinance setbacks.
374
Additionally, it is believed that the DEP needs to engage in more
outreach to inform municipalities about their right to participate
in the land use review process.375 Nevertheless, the Policy takes a
significant and positive step toward addressing the convergence of
land use and environmental objectives. It acknowledges that DEP
permit decisions implicate land use concerns and forces the DEP
to directly address conflicts while preserving the independence of
local authority. The Policy's statement that local land use author-
ity is viable even when local environmental regulation is pre-
empted strongly suggests that the DEP will recognize a municipal-
ity's right to impose zoning restrictions, such as setbacks, that are
more stringent than the Department's operational regulations.
V. SUGGESTIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS
The foregoing discussion of cases, themes, and observations
suggests ways in which Pennsylvania's preemption and suprem-
acy doctrines might be modified to ensure that they address the
growing intersection of environmental regulation and land use
planning. The following remarks address many levels of govern-
ance because all of them have a significant stake in ensuring legal
sustainability into the future.
First, the General Assembly must consistently recognize its
power over preemption and supremacy and rationally consider
legislative alternatives and their consequences. It should also
carefully look for regulatory overlap in what might seem to be
372. Telephone Interview with Denise M. Brinley, Executive Assistant, DEP Office of
Community Revitalization and Local Government Support (June 27, 2008). Ms, Brinley,
who handles the Policy Office review of potential conflicts, reported that she reviews one or






separate legal areas. Nowhere is this cautious approach more im-
portant than in areas where a law implicates local land use au-
thority. The initial legislative choice is between preemption and
concurrency, with the understanding that, for any given environ-
mental law, a mixed preemption/concurrency regime is also possi-
ble. Additionally, the legislature must consider preemption of two
types of municipal authority: local land use authority and local
police power to address nuisances and environmental matters. In
both cases, laws should be specific about the degree to which mu-
nicipal authority is foreclosed or retained. 376 As an alternative,
the General Assembly can direct the DEP, with proper guidelines,
to clarify the extent of local authority in its rulemaking, or expand
MPC provisions to augment state agency review of local land use
regulations.
377
In cases where the legislature authorizes local concurrent envi-
ronmental authority, it should decide whether state standards
establish a regulatory ceiling or floor, weighing the advantages
and disadvantages of each option.378 If a law is not meant to have
any impact on local land use authority, it should explicitly say so.
In all cases, drafting should proceed with care to ensure that
terms such as "preempt," "supersede," and other relevant statu-
tory phrases are clear and accurate.
Like the General Assembly, the EQB and DEP should clarify to
what extent local authority can coexist with their regulatory pro-
grams. Furthermore, the DEP should continue to vigorously im-
plement its Land Use Policy as it says it will: with an eye toward
preserving local land use authority within the permitting process.
This effort should include greater outreach to municipalities in
cases where the land use review process is triggered.
Courts also need to adjust their approach by consistently em-
ploying an analytical framework that distinguishes between pre-
emption and conflict. Because of their co-mingling of those con-
cepts, the Duff questions should be disassembled and repackaged
within a multistep analysis that first determines the scope of the
municipal authority at issue and whether the exercise of that au-
376. See Yanggen & Amrhein, supra note 15, at 94.
377. Id.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 344-49. In Pennsylvania, there may be less
leeway than in other states. Executive Order 1996-1, issued during the Ridge administra-
tion, mandates that where a federal regulation exists, Pennsylvania's regulations shall not
exceed the federal standard unless justified by a "compelling and articulable Pennsylvania
interest or required by state law." Thomas J. Ridge, Governor, Exec. Order No. 1996-1,
Regulatory Review and Promulgation 1(e) (Pa. Feb. 6, 1996).
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thority is ultra vires or unreasonable. If the ordinance fails for
one of these reasons, the analysis ends. If it proceeds, courts
should then confront the preemption question narrowly, asking
whether a state environmental law forecloses the specific munici-
pal power that has been exercised. If the state law does not ex-
pressly preempt the municipality's action, the court should con-
sider the possibility of field preemption by considering legislative
intent. Finally, if there is no express or implied preemption, then
the court must consider whether there is a conflict between the
state law and local ordinance. Ogontz dictates that the essence of
this analysis is statutory interpretation,379 where the statute's ob-
jectives are paramount. The distinction between the community-
focused objectives of local environmental and land use legislation,
and the statewide health and environmental objectives of state
environmental laws, should serve as the prism through which
courts consider legislative intent.
In this regard, a conflict analysis that asks whether local law al-
lows something prohibited by state law or prohibits something
state law allows (a common inquiry that is included in Duff s five
questions) 380 may prove to be overbroad. This is especially likely
to occur when the competing powers are themselves distinct. For
example, that question would certainly be answered in the af-
firmative if a local land use or nuisance setback is larger than one
included in a DEP solid waste rule. Because an affirmative an-
swer to any one of Duff s questions establishes conflict,38' the state
regulation would prevail. However, the allow/prohibit question
totally ignores the difference between state environmental author-
ity and local police power and land use authority. Local regula-
tions that allow something prohibited by state law may well estab-
lish conflict, but courts should reject the second part of the al-
low/prohibit question that asks if local law prohibits what state
law allows. Instead, courts should determine conflict by looking
solely to statutory construction, by examining the consequences of
allowing a local ordinance to coexist with state law.38 2 A carefully
crafted approach to preemption and conflict will foster consistency
379. Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 454-55.
380. Duff, 532 A.2d at 505 (asking, in ascertaining conflict, "whether the ordinance for-
bid[s] what the legislature has permitted . .
381. Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1033.
382. See Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455.
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and may help reduce the influence of judicial political ideologies in
matters of preemption.
38 3
Municipalities should also take steps to integrate land use and
environmental regulation in ways that are more efficient and less
likely to spur litigation. First, the means used to address the im-
pacts of environmentally offensive facilities matters. Zoning is
the best option because it can be used to preserve property values
and to promote the general welfare via aesthetic and even envi-
ronmental regulation. 38 4 Furthermore, the special play and defer-
ence given to zoning regulations, as well as the judicial under-
standing of its unique objectives, arguably give zoning ordinances
an advantage over police power ordinances in preemption and con-
flict disputes. Local authorities that instead choose to address
environmentally offensive facilities by police power regulation
should proceed only if they believe that the field is not preempted
and that an ordinance is needed to protect specific local- not
statewide-environmental well-being. Those municipalities that
fall within the DEP Land Use Policy should take advantage of
that program by encouraging zoning permit applicants to seek
letters of approval for early opt-out status and by promptly re-
sponding to DEP inquiries about potential conflict. Both the DEP
and local authorities should encourage facility owners to deal with
local regulations first, whether they are found in police power or
land use ordinances. Municipalities are free to condition land use
permits on DEP approval, 38 5 and early municipal approval can
streamline land use review by the DEP.
CONCLUSION
Virtually every environmental decision, whether made by the
state or a municipality, has an impact on land use; the reverse is
true as well. This reality becomes more apparent with every pass-
ing year, and it is certainly evident in the case law reviewed in
this article. The benefits of this interest convergence are signifi-
cant. There is now more holistic planning by the DEP by virtue of
its Land Use Policy and a broadened vision on the part of munici-
palities pursuant to statutes such as the SWMA, which engage
383. See text accompanying notes 330-36.
384. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10603(a), (b); Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d at 60 (likening
the police power ordinance at issue to zoning ordinances that protect the "public health,
property values and aesthetics").
385. See Bloom v. Lower Paxton Twp., 457 A.2d 166, 169 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983); Stein
v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Super's, 532 A.2d 906, 912 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
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them in important environmental undertakings. These develop-
ments will effect very real progress toward the type of integrated
planning demanded of sustainability. There are obstacles, how-
ever, including local regulatory initiatives that run afoul of state
authority under preemption or supremacy principles, and state
regulatory authority that is interpreted in ways that thwart le-
gitimate police power and land use regulation by municipalities.
Pennsylvania law has done well addressing the former threat, but
has not been consistent in addressing the latter. It is hoped that
the discussion and suggestions included in these pages will bring
attention to these issues and lead to a more principled preemption
and supremacy framework in Pennsylvania, one that will well
serve the public health and environment of the Commonwealth as
a whole and the welfare and concerns of its many diverse commu-
nities.

